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SHALL BUSINESSES PROFIT IF THEIR OWNERS 
LOSE THEIR SOULS?  EXAMINING WHETHER 
CLOSELY HELD CORPORATIONS MAY 
SEEK EXEMPTIONS FROM THE 
CONTRACEPTIVE MANDATE 
Christopher S. Ross* 
 
May for-profit, secular corporations claim the protection of the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)? 
This question is central to numerous lawsuits against the federal 
government in which business owners argue that certain regulations under 
the Patient Protection & Affordable Care Act substantially burden the 
exercise of their religion.  This Note examines the threshold hurdle that for-
profit business owners must clear to successfully state a claim under RFRA:  
the question of whether the businesses are “persons” the statute protects.  
This is an issue of first impression for the U.S. Supreme Court, and it has 
split the circuit courts of appeal. 
First, this Note provides an overview of free exercise jurisprudence, with 
a focus on the ebbs and flows of the Supreme Court’s exemption doctrine.  
This overview includes a discussion of the Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act and the laws, regulations, and religious objections that form the basis 
of the current disputes.  Second, this Note introduces the conflict among 
circuit courts and their varying interpretations of whether for-profit 
corporations are “persons” under RFRA.  Third, this Note assesses this 
conflict by examining RFRA’s text and the context in which Congress 
enacted the statute.  Nothing within this context precludes corporations 
from stating RFRA claims.  In addition, this Note examines legislative 
history that supports application of the Dictionary Act, which explains that 
the word “person” in federal statutes includes corporations.  This Note 
ultimately concludes that RFRA does indeed grant corporations the ability 
to seek exemptions, but that the statute will require courts to undertake the 
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“In reality, the [Religious Freedom Restoration Act] will not guarantee 
that religious claimants bringing free exercise challenges will win, but 
only that they have a chance to fight.”1 
INTRODUCTION 
Religious observers typically act according to their religion’s view of the 
ultimate good.2  This pursuit of the good can affect how an individual 
orders his or her entire life.3  Sometimes, however, obedience to religious 
 
 1. H.R. REP. NO. 103-88, at 17 (1993) (Additional Views of Hon. Henry J. Hyde, Hon. 
F. James Sensenbrenner, Hon. Bill McCollum, Hon. Howard Coble, Hon. Charles T. 
Canady, Hon. Bob Inglis, Hon. Robert W. Goodlatte). 
 2. See Alan Brownstein, Taking Free Exercise Rights Seriously, 57 CASE W. RES. L. 
REV. 55, 86 (2006). 
 3. See id. 
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dictates might require action that appears questionable to others or is even 
against the law.  Some Native American traditions, for example, suggest 
that followers ingest certain hallucinogens as part of sacramental 
ceremonies, even though the government classifies these hallucinogens as 
controlled substances.4  In addition, many faiths require action outside of 
ritualistic exercise.  Thus, members of pacifist religions might refuse to 
produce weapons in their work.5  Some religious acts, such as a Roman 
Catholic nurse objecting to performing abortions,6 even offend the 
sensibilities of those with different opinions on social or religious matters.7  
For each of these religious actors, faith governs more than merely 
association with the divine; it governs relationships, interactions with 
society, personal development, and even careers. 
A law or regulation might hinder or restrict religious exercise.8  
Following a shift in the U.S. Supreme Court’s jurisprudence that Congress 
believed might result in increased burdens on religion, Congress enacted the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act9 (RFRA).  RFRA sought to minimize 
the burdens that the nation could place on religious believers and gave 
courts the ability to review burdensome laws and exempt claimants 
burdened by those laws.10  But Congress was silent on exactly who it 
envisioned could take refuge within RFRA.  Federal courts now face a 
novel interpretive question:  whether for-profit, closely held11 corporations 
may claim the protection of this law.  Indeed, in March of 2014, the U.S. 
Supreme Court will hear a consolidated appeal of cases from the Third and 
Tenth Circuits, which disagreed on the approach to this question.12 
Plaintiffs in these cases object to a regulation promulgated by the 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) under the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act13 (ACA).  Over 300 plaintiffs claim 
 
 4. See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874 (1990). 
 5. See Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 710 (1981). 
 6. See Cenzon-DeCarlo v. Mount Sinai Hosp., 626 F.3d 695, 696 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 7. See The Opposition Is Overwhelming but Will the Administration Listen?, PLANNED 
PARENTHOOD (Sept. 27, 2008), http://www.plannedparenthood.org/about-us/newsroom/
press-releases/opposition-overwhelming-but-will-administration-listen-22389.htm. 
 8. See, e.g., Smith, 494 U.S. at 874 (examining whether a state law classifying peyote 
possession as a felony burdened the free exercise of the claimants’ religion). 
 9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2006). 
 10. See infra Part I.C. 
 11. This Note’s analysis focuses on closely held corporations, see infra note 241, in 
discussing corporate RFRA claims.  It does not analyze whether other business organizations 
can also state RFRA claims.  For a discussion of the relevance of corporate form to issues of 
standing, see generally Steven J. Willis, Corporations, Taxes, and Religion:  The Hobby 
Lobby and Conestoga Contraceptive Cases, 65 S.C. L. REV. 1 (2013). 
 12. See Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir.) (en banc), cert. 
granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013); Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of the U.S. 
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 724 F.3d 377 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 
(2013). 
 13. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 26 and 
42 U.S.C.). 
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that the HHS regulation burdens their religious exercise.14  The regulation, 
known colloquially as “the HHS mandate,”15 requires employer-sponsored 
insurance plans to provide some women’s preventive services, including 
contraceptives and sterilization procedures, without requiring the employee 
to share the cost.16  But it exempts companies below a certain size, as well 
as religious and nonprofit organizations that meet a stringent test.17  Both 
for-profit and nonprofit organizations have made religious objections to the 
HHS mandate18—most coming from various Christian traditions that have 
long opposed the use and distribution of contraception, particularly methods 
that they believe have an abortive tendency.19 
This Note examines a threshold hurdle that stands in the way of for-profit 
corporations’ ability to state RFRA claims:  the question of whether 
corporations are “persons” under the statute.  This is an issue of first 
impression for the Supreme Court, and it has split the circuits.20  Part I of 
this Note provides an overview of free exercise jurisprudence, with a focus 
on the ebbs and flows of the Supreme Court’s exemption doctrine and 
Congress’s legislative response.  Part I also explains the laws and 
regulations—and the religious objections—that form the basis of the current 
disputes.  Part II introduces this conflict more thoroughly by analyzing four 
appellate decisions with differing opinions.  Part III assesses this conflict, 
concludes that the purposes anticipated by RFRA do not exclude 
corporations, and provides the outline of a basic framework for courts as 
they begin the daunting task of ascertaining RFRA’s contours for corporate 
claimants. 
 
 14. See HHS Mandate Information Central, BECKET FUND FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, 
http://www.becketfund.org/hhsinformationcentral/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2014). 
 15. See id. 
 16. See Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of 
Preventive Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 
8725 (Feb. 15, 2012) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54, 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590, 45 C.F.R. pt. 
147); see also 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (Supp. V 2011). 
 17. See Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1122.  For a description of the nonprofit exemption, 
see infra notes 269–71. 
 18. See, e.g., Briscoe v. Sebelius, 927 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1112 (D. Colo. 2013) 
(confronting the argument that a for-profit corporation run by an Evangelical Christian was 
bound by faith not to provide access to abortion); Univ. of Notre Dame v. Sebelius, No. 
3:12-CV-253(RLM), 2012 WL 6756332, at *1 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 31, 2012) (confronting the 
argument that a nonprofit, Catholic educational institution was bound by religious doctrine 
not to provide access to abortion, sterilization, or contraception). 
 19. See, e.g., POPE PAUL VI, HUMANAE VITAE ¶ 14 (1968), available at 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/paul_vi/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-
vi_enc_25071968_humanae-vitae_en.html (“[T]he direct interruption of the generative 
process already begun and, above all, all direct abortion, even for therapeutic reasons, are to 
be absolutely excluded as lawful means of regulating the number of children.  Equally to be 
condemned . . . is direct sterilization . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 20. See infra Part II. 
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I.  FREE EXERCISE JURISPRUDENCE, LEGISLATIVE EXEMPTIONS, AND 
CORPORATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS:  A BACKGROUND 
The Supreme Court’s free exercise jurisprudence and Congress’s 
subsequent reactions create a complex ebb and flow of tests and doctrines.  
This Part first examines the history of free exercise and the Court’s cases 
that established and then disestablished a regime of exempting religious 
adherents from laws that burdened their religious exercise.  It then examines 
the legislative response to this line of cases and introduces how 
corporations fit into the picture. 
A.  The Historical Understanding of the Free Exercise Clause 
The question of exemptions for religious believers has roots in the 
historical understanding of the Free Exercise Clause, which represents a 
fusion of various political theories.21  A number of American colonies 
protected religious dissenters and afforded members of religious sects the 
opportunity to escape the religious persecution of both England and the 
other colonies.22  The most protective colonies were the first to formulate 
the free exercise of religion as a legal principle.23  Eventually, certain 
colonial charters also allowed colonial proprietors to grant “indulgences and 
dispensations” to religious believers burdened by the colony’s laws.24  This 
exemption power was discretionary.25 
Following the Revolutionary War, the new states and eventually the 
federal government had to determine how best to protect religious liberty.26  
For example, James Madison successfully27 proposed that Virginia’s Bill of 
Rights protect “the full and free exercise of [religion].”28  The American 
system would no longer be based on mere tolerance—religion was not a gift 
from government, but rather a duty to God that no government could 
abridge.29  By 1789, every state except Connecticut provided some 
protection of religious freedom.30  This generally extended to religious 
 
 21. See John Witte, Jr., The Essential Rights and Liberties of Religion in the American 
Constitutional Experiment, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 371, 377–89 (1996). 
 22. See Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free 
Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1424–25 (1990). 
 23. See id. at 1425. 
 24. See id. at 1428 (quoting CAROLINA CHARTER OF 1665, reprinted in 2 FEDERAL AND 
STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE UNITED 
STATES 1328, 1338 (Benjamin Perley Poore ed., Washington, Gov’t Printing Office 2d ed. 
1878)).  For examples of legislatures and executives granting exemptions, see id. at 1467–
73. 
 25. See id. at 1428. 
 26. See id. at 1455, 1473. 
 27. See id. at 1443. 
 28. See Stephen Pepper, Taking the Free Exercise Clause Seriously, 1986 BYU L. REV. 
299, 303 (alteration in original) (quoting Gaillard Hunt, James Madison and Religious 
Liberty, in 1 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE YEAR 
1901, at 163, 165–66 (1902)). 
 29. See McConnell, supra note 22, at 1443–44. 
 30. See id. at 1455. 
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practice, in addition to belief.31  Accordingly, some states offered 
accommodations32 to minorities whose beliefs were at odds with societal 
mores.33  Free exercise rights, however, were subject to certain limitations 
that served the interests of the states.34  For example, a state might allow 
free exercise rights for peaceable actions, but not for licentious ones.35 
When the several states joined to form the federal government, they 
drafted a Constitution banning religious tests for office36 and allowing for 
either oaths or affirmations.37  Beyond these, however, the Federalists 
writing the Constitution saw little need to enact protection of religious 
rights, as they believed that the nature of the federal system, checks and 
balances between government branches, and the numerous religious sects 
would ensure the protection of religious minorities.38  This argument did 
not convince such groups as the Quakers, who feared the effects of laws 
passed without consideration of minority beliefs.39  Later, to protect 
individual liberty expressly, Congress enacted the Bill of Rights40 and, 
within this set of amendments, the Religion Clause.41  Initially, the 
delegates discussed religious liberty in terms of the “rights of conscience” 
 
 31. See id. at 1459 (explaining that the dictionaries of the day included “action” in their 
definitions of “exercise”). 
 32. McConnell acknowledges that his examples of religious accommodation “were 
initiated by the legislature.” Id. at 1473.  He suggests, however, that it is reasonable to 
suppose that framers of state and the federal free exercise provisions understood that courts 
would create and enforce similar protections. Id. 
 33. See id. at 1467.  For example, an oath requirement might ensure honest testimony in 
court, but it would violate the religious beliefs of Quakers. Id.  A Quaker in a lawsuit, 
therefore, would not be able to testify in court. See id.  To protect conscientious objectors, 
most state governments allowed alternative procedures. Id. 
 34. See id. at 1461–62. 
 35. See id. 
 36. See U.S. CONST. art. VI. 
 37. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (providing the text of an oath or affirmation the president 
must take before entering office); U.S. CONST. art. VI (requiring that all government officials 
take an oath or affirmation to support the U.S. Constitution). 
 38. See McConnell, supra note 22, at 1475–80; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 84 
(Alexander Hamilton). 
 39. See McConnell, supra note 22, at 1480.  The Quakers’ concern comports with a 
view of the Free Exercise Clause described by Christopher Eisgruber and Lawrence Sager, 
who propose that the Free Exercise Clause should protect minority viewpoints rather than 
privilege religion. See generally Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The 
Vulnerability of Conscience:  The Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1245 (1994). 
 40. See U.S. CONST. amends. I–X. 
 41. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment 
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”).  Scholars divide this section of the 
First Amendment into two bodies of law.  See, e.g., Abner S. Greene, The Political Balance 
of the Religion Clauses, 102 YALE L.J. 1611, 1612 (1993); Ira C. Lupu, Threading Between 
the Religion Clauses, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 439, 439 (2000).  Each clause has its own 
corresponding jurisprudence. Compare Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) 
(explaining a test for whether a law violates the Establishment Clause), with Emp’t Div. v. 
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881–82 (1990) (holding that neutral laws of general applicability do 
not violate the Free Exercise Clause). 
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but eventually decided on the “free exercise of religion.”42  As used in the 
colonies and states, “free exercise” protected public conduct emanating 
from religious motivation, including religious speech, worship, assembly, 
publication, and education.43  Exercise also included the right to join with 
other members of the faith to worship.44  This understanding of the Free 
Exercise Clause fused views of both the importance of protecting religion 
and the prevailing Enlightenment philosophy of the day by allowing 
individuals to worship according to their conscience and restricting 
government from interfering with religious practice.45 
B.  The Court Giveth and the Court Taketh Away:  A History of Exemptions 
in the Supreme Court 
At its core, the Free Exercise Clause, made applicable to the states 
through the Fourteenth Amendment,46 means the right to believe and to 
profess religious doctrine.47  The Clause therefore prohibits the government 
from any regulation of religious beliefs,48 such as compelling beliefs or 
punishing religious expression.49 
The extent to which the Clause protects conduct, however, has been the 
subject of much debate.50  The Supreme Court initially protected matters of 
belief, but not necessarily conduct.51  For example, the Mormon practice of 
polygamy was religious, and Mormons sought to use religion as a defense 
while on trial for violating an antipolygamy statute.52  The Court disagreed 
and held that the Constitution did not require the government to allow 
 
 42. See McConnell, supra note 22, at 1482–83 (internal quotation marks omitted).  “Free 
exercise” protects more than the “rights of conscience,” according to McConnell. See id. at 
1490.  The former denotes the application of the religious belief, while the latter indicates 
the knowledge or rationale of the belief. Id. at 1489.  For the First Amendment, this is a key 
distinction.  Beliefs are definitively protected, but it would appear that actions undertaken as 
a matter of sincere, religious belief receive protection too. See id. at 1491–96. 
 43. See Witte, supra note 21, at 394–95. 
 44. See id. at 395.  The liberty to join in religious association included the liberty to 
govern the religious body without governmental interference. See id. 
 45. See McConnell, supra note 22, at 1498–99 (“The religious view emphasizes the 
importance of the individual; the Enlightenment, the incapacity of the government.”).  For a 
description of additional political and theological understandings that form the foundation of 
the American conception and dedication to religious liberty, see generally Witte, supra note 
21 (describing theories that yielded principles of liberty of conscience, free exercise of 
religion, pluralism, equality, separationism, and disestablishment of religion). 
 46. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940). 
 47. See Emp’t Div.  v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990). 
 48. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963). 
 49. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 877. 
 50. See infra Part I.B–D. 
 51. See Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 345 (1890) (“Whilst legislation for the 
establishment of a religion is forbidden, and its free exercise permitted, it does not follow 
that everything which may be so called can be tolerated.  Crime is not the less odious 
because sanctioned by what any particular sect may designate as religion.”); Reynolds v. 
United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878) (holding that laws banning polygamy were within 
Congress’s legislative power). 
 52. See Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 161. 
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Mormons to state this belief as a defense before a jury.53  This distinction 
between belief and conduct did not stand, however, in the latter half of the 
twentieth century.54  Beginning in Sherbert v. Verner,55 the Court construed 
the First Amendment to require exemptions from otherwise valid laws that 
substantially burdened individuals’ religious beliefs or practice.56  Sherbert 
and its progeny, including Wisconsin v. Yoder,57 presented cases where an 
individual claimed that a law had the effect of hampering his or her 
religious practice. 
1.  The Creation of the Exemption Regime:  Sherbert v. Verner and 
Wisconsin v. Yoder 
The Supreme Court first articulated a standard for exemptions in 
Sherbert.58  Adell Sherbert was a member of the Seventh-Day Adventist 
Church when her employer adjusted the number of days in its work week.59  
Because Sherbert refused to report to work on the Adventists’s holy day, 
her employer discharged her.60  She sought unemployment benefits from 
South Carolina’s Employment Security Commission, but the agency found 
that her refusal to take Saturday work disqualified her.61  In response to 
Sherbert’s free exercise challenge, the South Carolina Supreme Court 
upheld the commission’s decision, holding that the unemployment statute 
did not restrict her ability to observe her religious beliefs.62 
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed South Carolina’s court, noting that the 
Free Exercise Clause prevents the government from regulating “religious 
beliefs as such.”63  It also acknowledged that it had rejected free exercise 
challenges on the ground that legislation may restrict religious practices if 
such practices threaten public safety, peace, or order.64  Despite this 
precedent, the Court found that South Carolina’s withholding of 
unemployment benefits was a substantial burden on the free exercise of 
Sherbert’s religion.65  The state denied benefits because of her religiously 
motivated action, and the pressure to forego her beliefs to obtain the benefit 
was a substantial burden.66 
 
 53. See id. at 164, 166 (explaining that Congress’s legislation was “free to reach actions 
which were in violation of social duties or subversive of good order” and that a person may 
not “excuse his practices . . . because of his religious belief”). 
 54. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963). 
 55. Id. 
 56. See Eugene Volokh, A Common-Law Model for Religious Exemptions, 46 UCLA L. 
REV. 1465, 1473 (1999). 
 57. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
 58. See 374 U.S. at 410. 
 59. Id. at 399. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 399–401. 
 62. See id. at 401. 
 63. Id. at 402. 
 64. Id. at 402–03. 
 65. Id. at 403. 
 66. Id. 
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Because the law substantially burdened Sherbert’s religion, the Court 
examined whether South Carolina had a compelling interest to justify 
infringing upon her First Amendment rights.67  In light of the claim’s 
constitutional basis, the Court explained that “[o]nly the gravest abuses, 
endangering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible 
limitation.”68  The state argued that its interests were to prevent fraudulent 
claims that might cause a dilution of the unemployment fund,69 but the 
Court stated that this interest did not justify abridging Sherbert’s free 
exercise rights.70  The state, therefore, had to exempt Sherbert from its law 
and provide unemployment benefits.71 
The Supreme Court later affirmed this analysis in Wisconsin v. Yoder.72  
There, Amish parents declined to send their children to school after their 
children completed the eighth grade.73  Wisconsin’s compulsory attendance 
law required parents to send their children to school through age sixteen.74  
The Amish parents were convicted of violating this law and fined $5.00 
each.75 
The Court noted that education is a strong state interest, but even such 
strong interests are still subject to a balancing process.76  To determine the 
balance in this case, the Court examined the Amish religion and found that 
its commitment to not sending children to school beyond the eighth grade 
was religiously motivated behavior.77  Indeed, despite increasing regulation 
that had encroached upon the traditional Amish way of life, the religion’s 
traditions had not changed.78  Amish families continued to believe that 
additional schooling interfered with their way of life.79  The Court held that 
the Wisconsin compulsory attendance law, which carried the threat of 
criminal sanction, substantially burdened the petitioners’ religion.80  To 
 
 67. See id. at 406. 
 68. Id. at 406 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)). 
 69. See id. at 407. 
 70. See id. 
 71. Id.  The Court did not directly state an intent to create a constitutionally compelled 
exemption regime.  In dissent, however, Justice John Marshall Harlan II explained that the 
Court’s holding meant that “if the State chooses to condition unemployment compensation 
on the applicant’s availability for work, it is constitutionally compelled to carve out an 
exception—and to provide benefits—for those whose unavailability is due to their religious 
convictions.” Id. at 420 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 72. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
 73. Id. at 207.  The Amish “believed that by sending their children to high school, they 
would not only expose themselves to the danger of the censure of the church community, but 
. . . also endanger their own salvation and that of their children.” Id. at 209. 
 74. Id. at 207. 
 75. Id. at 208. 
 76. Id. at 214–15 (“[O]nly those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise 
served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion.”). 
 77. See id. at 216–18. 
 78. Id. at 217. 
 79. Id. at 218. 
 80. See id. 
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require compliance, the Court explained, would endanger or destroy Amish 
religious exercise.81 
Wisconsin argued that its interest in compulsory education was 
sufficiently compelling to override the Amish religious practices.82  The 
Court did not accept such a sweeping claim, however, and stated that the 
government must present a specific interest and the harm that would result 
if the government granted an exemption.83  The resulting analysis showed 
that, as applied to the Amish petitioners, the additional years of school 
required by the law would do little to serve the state’s interests, because the 
Amish way of life centered around a separate agrarian community.84  
Therefore, even though Wisconsin had a strong interest in education, the 
Amish families satisfactorily demonstrated a need for an exemption from 
the education law.85 
Together, Sherbert and Yoder stood for the proposition that a religious 
believer may obtain an exemption from a law by showing that the law 
substantially burdens his or her free exercise of religion, and that the state 
has no compelling interest that outweighs the burden in question.86  This 
protection of religious faith extended to matters of action or conduct, and 
not just belief.87  Moreover, if the state action could not withstand a court’s 
scrutiny, the Constitution compelled the exemption.88 
 
 81. Id. at 219. 
 82. Id. at 221. 
 83. See id.  In other words, the Court established that it would view free exercise 
exemption claims with strict scrutiny. See Volokh, supra note 56, at 1467.  In cases 
concerning constitutional law, the Court views different types of claims with various levels 
of scrutiny. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 551 (4th ed. 2011).  When 
important rights are at stake, the government must meet a heavy burden and show that the 
law is “necessary to achieve a compelling government purpose.” See id. at 554 (emphasis 
omitted).  This is the strict scrutiny explained in Sherbert and Yoder, as well as the test 
codified in RFRA. See infra Part I.C.  The Court uses a more deferential level of review in 
other contexts.  The rational basis test requires that the government show that it is “rationally 
related to a legitimate government purpose.” See CHEMERINSKY, supra, at 552 (emphasis 
omitted). 
 84. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 222.  Wisconsin also attacked the “ignorance” that Amish 
parents would bequeath to their children. See id.  The Court rebuked this critique of a 
minority religion. Id. at 224 (“A way of life that is odd or even erratic but interferes with no 
rights or interests of others is not to be condemned because it is different.”). 
 85. See id. at 235. 
 86. See id. at 240 (Stewart, J., concurring) (“Decisions in cases such as this . . . will 
inevitably involve the kind of close and perhaps repeated scrutiny of religious practices, as is 
exemplified in today’s opinion, which the Court has heretofore been anxious to avoid.”). But 
see Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 39 (arguing that religion should not receive special 
privilege, but rather that the law should regard religions equally).  In a context in which 
administrative schemes provide discretion to decisionmakers, therefore, courts should have 
discretion to grant exemptions to protect religious minorities from veiled discrimination. See 
Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 39, at 1299–1300. 
 87. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 216; Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402–03 (1963); see 
also Mark L. Rienzi, God and the Profits:  Is There Religious Liberty for Moneymakers?, 21 
GEO. MASON L. REV. 59, 65 n.40 (2013) (explaining that the key for protected activity is 
motivation by religious belief). 
 88. See Volokh, supra note 56, at 1473 (explaining that before Sherbert, it was for 
legislatures to grant exemptions, but that Sherbert “launched the constitutional exemption 
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Following Sherbert and Yoder, courts heard a variety of cases in which 
petitioners sought exemptions, claiming that laws burdened their religious 
practice.89  For example, the Court granted an exemption to a Jehovah’s 
Witness who was denied unemployment insurance after he quit his job in a 
metal factory when he discovered that he was producing armaments.90  The 
Court explained that it would not “dissect” his beliefs in order to determine 
whether his understanding of his religion was “unreasonable.”91  Instead, 
the Court found that Indiana’s law would require Thomas to modify his 
beliefs in order to continue working, and that conditioning unemployment 
benefits on this choice substantially burdened his religious exercise.92  
Similarly, a woman who changed religions during the course of her 
employment stated a valid free exercise claim when the unemployment 
commission denied her benefits for failing to work on her Sabbath day.93 
Claimants did not, however, always find success before the Supreme 
Court.94  For example, claimants who were part of the armed forces could 
not seek the same level of protection as civilians, even if a law substantially 
burdened their religion, because of the military’s compelling interest in 
“instinctive obedience” and the “esprit de corps.”95  A Jewish claimant, 
therefore, could not challenge a regulation prohibiting his religious use of a 
yarmulke.96  The Court also denied free exercise claims when the 
exemption would require the government to adjust its internal affairs to 
account for interference with—and not necessarily a burden on—an 
individual’s spiritual development.97  For example, the government’s use of 
social security numbers for administrative efficiency did not amount to 
impairing religious beliefs or exercise.98  Finally, the meaning of “burden” 
was in flux, and different interpretations of the term yielded different results 
 
regime” under which the Constitution would compel an exemption if a law failed to pass 
strict scrutiny). 
 89. See, e.g., Mozert v. Hawkins Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1065 (6th Cir. 
1987) (explaining that requiring students to read certain materials without requiring them to 
affirm or deny a belief or to participate in an objectionable practice is not an unconstitutional 
violation of students’ free exercise); Bethel Baptist Church v. United States, 629 F. Supp. 
1073, 1085–87 (M.D. Pa. 1986) (holding that requiring churches to pay social security taxes 
was an indirect burden justified by a compelling governmental interest in a sound tax 
program). 
 90. See Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 710–12, 720 (1981). 
 91. See id. at 715. 
 92. See id. at 717–18. 
 93. See Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136, 138, 141–42 (1987). 
 94. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (holding that a member of the 
Old Order Amish religion could not receive an exemption from requirements to pay Social 
Security taxes). 
 95. See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986). 
 96. See id. at 510 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 97. See Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 449 (1988) 
(holding that while construction on government land that was sacred to Native Americans 
might hinder spiritual development, it did not burden religious beliefs or exercise); see also 
Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699–700 (1986) (explaining that the First Amendment did not 
“require the Government itself to behave in ways” to further individuals’ spiritual 
development). 
 98. See Bowen, 476 U.S. at 700. 
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for claimants.99  These inconsistences in the application of the doctrine 
caused some scholars to state that it rarely operated as strict scrutiny.100 
2.  The Fall of the Exemption Regime:  Employment Division v. Smith 
The Sherbert and Yoder exemption regime appeared to end in 1990, 
when the Court shifted its Free Exercise Clause analysis to hold that neutral 
laws of general applicability did not violate claimants’ free exercise 
rights.101  In Employment Division v. Smith, two members of the Native 
American Church lost their jobs at a drug rehabilitation facility after 
ingesting peyote,102 a felony offense in Oregon, as part of a religious 
ceremony.103  Relying on the Sherbert line of cases, the respondents sought 
an exemption from Oregon’s law classifying possession of a controlled 
substance as a felony.104  The Court distinguished their case from Sherbert, 
however, where the religious behavior was not criminal.105  The Court 
explained that granting respondents’ exemption claim would result in a 
large expansion of free exercise rights because the law did not target their 
religious practice and was otherwise constitutional against other peyote 
users.106 
The Court stated that it had never allowed an individual’s beliefs to 
excuse that person from complying with valid laws within the state’s 
purview.107  When it previously held that the First Amendment required 
exemption from a neutral law of general applicability, such as in Yoder, it 
was “in conjunction with other constitutional protections,” such as the right 
to free speech or parental rights.108  The Court limited Sherbert to 
 
 99. See Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin:  The Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise 
of Religion, 102 HARV. L. REV. 933, 961 (1989). 
 100. See Richard F. Duncan, Free Exercise Is Dead, Long Live Free Exercise:  Smith, 
Lukumi, and the General Applicability Requirement, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 850, 852 (2001); 
Laura Underkuffler-Freund, The Separation of the Religious and the Secular:  A 
Foundational Challenge to First Amendment Theory, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 837, 852–53 
(1995). 
 101. See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882 (1990). 
 102. Peyote is a hallucinogen that comes from the plant Lophophora williamsii Lemaire. 
See id. at 874. 
 103. See id.  The Court accepted that the Smith petitioners were members of the Native 
American Church. See id.  A New York Times article, however, indicates that Alfred Smith 
and Galen Black were guests at the ceremony in which they ingested peyote and that they 
did so to learn about the religious practice, not to participate in a sacrament. See Oregon 
Peyote Law Leaves 1983 Defendant Unvindicated, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 1991, at A14. 
 104. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 876. 
 105. See id. 
 106. See id. at 878. 
 107. See id. at 878–79; see also id. at 880 (explaining that recent cases upheld neutral 
laws of general applicability against free exercise challenges in Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 
U.S. 599 (1961), and United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982)). 
 108. Id. at 881.  Some, however, critique this “hybrid rights” view of the Court’s free 
exercise jurisprudence, stating that it represents a misreading of such cases as Yoder. See 
James G. Dwyer, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly of Employment Division v. Smith for 
Family Law, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1781, 1784–85 (2011) (explaining that Yoder rejected 
substantive due process claims as the basis of its holding and relied wholly upon free 
exercise). 
1964 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
unemployment cases, and explained that where state unemployment 
benefits programs allowed for individual exemptions, the state must 
describe a compelling reason for extending the system to cases of religious 
hardship.109  Outside of this limited scope, the Free Exercise Clause did not 
require court-created exemptions from otherwise neutral, generally 
applicable laws.110  The Court thus rejected the idea that the Constitution 
compelled application of the Sherbert balancing test to general laws that 
incidentally burdened individuals’ free exercise of religion.111  Free 
exercise claims that challenged neutral laws of general applicability would 
receive only rational basis review going forward.112 
Justice Antonin Scalia bolstered his Smith holding in two additional 
ways.  First, he explained the problems associated with judicial 
determination of questions about religion, even in case-by-case 
proceedings.113  Second, he explained that subjecting generally applicable 
laws to the compelling interest test whenever such a law burdened a 
person’s religious exercise “would be courting anarchy.”114  He did, 
however, note that even if the First Amendment did not require judicially 
crafted exemptions for these reasons, the legislature might be more 
accommodating.115  Indeed, he pointed to state accommodations of 
sacramental peyote use as a “solicitous” protection of the value of religious 
freedom.116 
Between 1963 and 1990, the Court created a process of exempting 
religious behavior from burdensome laws and then later claimed not to have 
such power.  Legal scholars fiercely debated whether the First Amendment 
required such exemptions.117  Following Smith, however, free exercise 
 
 109. Smith, 494 U.S. at 882–85. 
 110. See id.; see also Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 39, at 1247. 
 111. Smith, 494 U.S. at 884–85. 
 112. See, e.g., Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 671 (7th Cir. 2013); Fortress Bible 
Church v. Feiner, 694 F.3d 208, 220 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 113. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 887 (“Repeatedly and in many different contexts, we have 
warned that courts must not presume to determine the place of a particular belief in a religion 
or the plausibility of a religious claim.”). 
 114. See id. at 888. 
 115. See id. at 890. 
 116. Id. (“It is therefore not surprising that a number of States have made an exception to 
their drug laws for sacramental peyote use.”). 
 117. Compare Gerard V. Bradley, Beguiled:  Free Exercise Exemptions and the Siren 
Song of Liberalism, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 245, 248 (1991) (arguing that constitutionally 
compelled exemptions are “manifestly contrary to the plain meaning of the Free Exercise 
Clause”), and Philip A. Hamburger, A Constitutional Right of Religious Exemption:  An 
Historical Perspective, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 915, 940 (1992) (asserting that individuals 
historically sought occasional exemptions from certain laws but that this did not amount to a 
general or a constitutional right to an exemption), with McConnell, supra note 22, at 1513–
16 (arguing that the First Amendment requires religious exemptions). 
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claims required courts to analyze whether a law was neutral118 and 
generally applicable.119  The Constitution did not allow for exemptions. 
 
C.  Congress Restores the Exemption Regime:   
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
Justice Scalia’s opinion in Employment Division v. Smith inspired intense 
debate.120  In response, a strongly bipartisan Congress121 passed RFRA, 
which reinstated the Sherbert regime and instructed the courts to analyze 
laws burdening religious practice with strict scrutiny.122  Professor Douglas 
Laycock, a major academic force behind the law, explained that the drafters 
intended RFRA to ensure that people need not abandon their religious 
beliefs to comply with the law.123  In its findings, Congress explained that 
neutral laws “may burden religious exercise as surely as laws intended to 
interfere with religious exercise,”124 that “governments should not 
substantially burden religious exercise without compelling justification,”125 
and that the Smith Court “virtually eliminated the requirement that the 
government justify burdens on religious exercise imposed by laws neutral 
toward religion.”126  The Act’s purpose, then, was to restore Sherbert and 
Yoder’s compelling interest test.127 
To achieve its goals, RFRA provided in its operative section as follows: 
(a) In General—Government shall not substantially burden a person’s 
exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general 
applicability, except as provided in subsection (b) of this section. 
 
 118. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 
(1993) (holding that a law directly targeting religious practices was unconstitutional). 
 119. See Duncan, supra note 100, at 851 (“[T]he key to understanding the Constitution’s 
protection of religious liberty in the post-Smith world is to locate the boundary line between 
neutral laws of general applicability and those that fall short of this standard.”). 
 120. See, e.g., William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 
58 U. CHI. L. REV. 308, 308 (1991) (defending Smith against McConnell and others); 
Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1109, 1110 (1990) (critiquing the analysis in Smith). 
 121. See Remarks on Signing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 29 
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 2377–78 (Nov. 16, 1993) (explaining that the bill passed in the 
Senate ninety-seven to three and had overwhelming support in the House of Representatives 
on a voice vote). 
 122. See The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 
1488, invalidated by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), amended by Religious 
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2006)). 
 123. See Douglas Laycock, RFRA, Congress, and the Ratchet, 56 MONT. L. REV. 145, 146 
(1995) (explaining, among other examples, that RFRA might protect those who run a day 
care, because the government might not see day care management as religious exercise). 
 124. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(2). 
 125. See id. § 2000bb(a)(3). 
 126. See id. § 2000bb(a)(4); see also Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 671 (7th Cir. 2013) 
(“RFRA represents a congressional judgment that the rule of Smith is insufficiently 
protective of religious liberty.”). 
 127. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b). 
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(b) Exception—Government may substantially burden a person’s 
exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden 
to the person— 
 (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and 
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling 
governmental interest.128 
To apply this test, courts must examine the application of the interest to the 
individual claimant, rather than to the general population.129  In addition, 
the nature of compelling interest as articulated in Yoder, Sherbert, and other 
pre-Smith cases places a high burden on the government to articulate 
concrete reasons for the law’s application.130  This strict scrutiny applies 
only if a law is a substantial burden of religious exercise.131  Thus, neither 
an insubstantial burden nor a burden on nonreligious activities qualifies for 
the protection afforded by RFRA.132 
In the committee report that accompanied RFRA, Congress explained 
that it expected courts to rely on free exercise cases decided before Smith to 
determine whether religious exercise has been burdened.133  Moreover, the 
committee explained that it did not intend to codify any specific free 
exercise decision, but rather to restore the Court’s legal standard in those 
cases.134  A court must still consider relevant facts and circumstances.135  
Federal courts have interpreted RFRA to expressly require accommodation 
instead of insisting on Smith neutrality.136 
Congress defined certain operative terms in RFRA.137  Its broad scope 
was clear through its definition of “government,” which included the 
various parts of federal, state, and local governing bodies.138  In addition, 
Congress defined the “exercise of religion” as “the exercise of religion 
under the First Amendment to the Constitution.”139  Scholars noted that 
defining “religion” any other way would prove difficult to adjudicate, and 
that courts had already shown the ability to differentiate between religiously 
 
 128. See id. § 2000bb-1.  Any person may state a claim for judicial relief if a law burdens 
the exercise of their religion. See id. § 2000bb-1(c). 
 129. See Laycock, supra note 123, at 148. 
 130. See Douglas Laycock & Oliver S. Thomas, Interpreting the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act, 73 TEX. L. REV. 209, 222–26 (1994). 
 131. See id. at 228. 
 132. See id. 
 133. H.R. REP. NO. 103-88, at 7 (1993). 
 134. See id.; see also Laycock & Thomas, supra note 130, at 218. 
 135. See Laycock & Thomas, supra note 130, at 218. 
 136. See Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 671–72 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting O’Bryan v. 
Bureau of Prisons, 349 F.3d 399, 401 (7th Cir. 2003)). 
 137. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2 (2006).  Notably, Congress did not define “person.” See 
infra Part II. 
 138. See The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141 § 5, 107 
Stat. 1488, invalidated by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), amended by 
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 
Stat. 803 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2). 
 139. See id.  This language was amended by the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized 
Persons Act of 2000.  The current version can be found at 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A). 
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motivated and nonreligious behavior.140  Principal organizers of RFRA 
indicated, however, that it would protect individuals and that the Dictionary 
Act’s default definition of “person”141 meant it would also cover religious 
organizations.142  Defining the statute in such broad terms was not only a 
political necessity to keep Congress out of the weeds of specific 
applications; it was also a matter of principle because the statute performed 
a constitutional function by enacting the congressional understanding of the 
Free Exercise Clause.143 
The statute’s sweep was also clear from its broad applicability; as 
originally enacted, RFRA “applie[d] to all Federal and State law, and the 
implementation of that law, whether statutory or otherwise, and whether 
adopted before or after [November 16, 1993],” unless Congress excluded 
applicability through explicit reference to 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-3.144  
Because of its applicability to every law passed by any local, state, or 
federal government, RFRA garnered a reputation as a “super-statute.”145  
Because the law had such breadth and swept across the entirety of 
American law, it was not simply a change from Smith.146  Rather, it 
represented a substantially different vision of religious liberty and indicated 
Congress’s intent to allow people of all religious persuasions to enjoy a 
fundamental right by restoring pre-Smith free exercise protection.147 
 
 140. See Laycock & Thomas, supra note 130, at 233–34. 
 141. See 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).  For further explanation of the Dictionary Act, see infra 
note 215. 
 142. See Laycock & Thomas, supra note 130, at 234.  Interestingly, early drafts of RFRA 
defined “person,” whereas the enacted version did not. See H.R. 5377, 101st Cong. § 4(4) 
(1990) (defining person as “natural persons and religious organizations, associations, or 
corporations); H.R. 4040, 102d Cong. § 5(4) (1991) (defining person as “natural persons and 
organizations, association [sic], corporations, or other entities”).  The use of legislative 
history in statutory interpretation is frequently suspect, especially when the history is 
unexplained, prior versions of a statute. See JOSEPH L. GERKEN, WHAT GOOD IS LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY?  JUSTICE SCALIA IN THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS 22 (2007); Max Radin, 
Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 873 (1930).  The difficulty lies in weighing 
the relative value of various sources. See CHRISTIAN E. MAMMEN, USING LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY IN AMERICAN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 66 (2002).  If a judge can determine a 
reason for the change, however, it might be useful in interpreting the statute. See JOHN F. 
MANNING & MATTHEW C. STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION & REGULATION 159–60 (1st ed. 2010). 
 143. See Laycock & Thomas, supra note 130, at 219. 
 144. See The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 § 6. 
 145. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, A RFRA Runs Through It:  Religious Freedom and the 
U.S. Code, 56 MONT. L. REV. 249, 253–54 (1995) (“RFRA is thus a powerful current 
running through the entire landscape of the U.S. Code.”). 
 146. See Laycock & Thomas, supra note 130, at 244–45. 
 147. See id.  There is some debate about whether Congress intended to expand pre-Smith 
protection through RFRA, or whether it intended to restore this protection. Compare Michael 
C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1175, 1213 (1996) 
(“RFRA does not, however, simply restore the pre-Smith law.”), with H.R. REP. 103-88, at 
15 (Additional Views of Hon. Henry J. Hyde, Hon. F. James Sensenbrenner, Hon. Bill 
McCollum, Hon. Howard Coble, Hon. Charles T. Canady, Hon. Bob Inglis, Hon. Robert W. 
Goodlatte) (“[T]he bill does not reinstate the free exercise standard to the high water mark as 
found in Sherbert v. Verner and Wisconsin v. Yoder, but merely returns the law to the state it 
existed prior to Smith.”).  Because the Court frequently rejected pre-Smith free exercise 
claims using the Sherbert test, see supra notes 94–100 and accompanying text, the difference 
between expanding and restoring pre-Smith protection matters for resolving the merits of 
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Professor Eugene Volokh explained that RFRA sought to restore the 
courts as decisionmakers on claims of religious freedom, contrary to 
Smith’s claim that courts were not the proper body to make such 
decisions.148  Sherbert launched a constitutional model in which courts 
decided who would receive exemptions, but Smith instructed that 
exemptions should be purely statutory.149  RFRA, then, adopted a model in 
which courts would evaluate claims individually and continue to build upon 
Sherbert and its progeny.150  Volokh called this the “common-law 
exemption model” because it granted courts the “initial discretionary 
decision-making power” and asked them to design a jurisprudence in 
accordance with Congress’s vision for religious liberty.151 
In addition, RFRA claimed that the pre-Smith compelling interest test 
provided a sensible balance between religious liberty and the government’s 
interests.152  A judge striking this balance does not necessarily have the 
final say, however, because the decision would be statutory and not 
constitutional.153  In matters of statutory interpretation, judges must 
interpret the law and might make incremental changes, but legislatures 
retain ultimate authority to reverse judicial action.154  If Congress 
determined that a court was “too stingy” in withholding an exemption from 
a statute that substantially burdens a person’s religious exercise, then it 
could enact a specific exemption to address that situation.155  Conversely, if 
Congress found that a court overreached in granting an exemption, it could 
amend the relevant statute to withhold exemptions.156  Although the 
decisions in individual RFRA cases would be final, the underlying statute 
could be amended for future application, placing claims for religious liberty 
into the political process, which is how American law generally developed 
in a common law system.157  Thus, the law acts to overcome legislative 
inertia by granting individuals the ability to petition courts for redress rather 
than wait for legislatures to act.158  RFRA may also encourage courts to 
 
RFRA claims.  This Note, however, does not address the substance of the HHS mandate 
claims and therefore does not attempt to resolve this issue. 
 148. See Volokh, supra note 56, at 1468. 
 149. See id. 
 150. See id. 
 151. See id. at 1470. 
 152. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(5) (2006). 
 153. See Douglas Laycock, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 1993 BYU L. REV. 
221, 253 (“If the Court strikes the balance in an unacceptable way, Congress can respond 
with new legislation.”). 
 154. See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 5–6 (1982). 
 155. See Volokh, supra note 56, at 1476. 
 156. See id. 
 157. See id. at 1469.  Like Volokh, this Note does not refer to common law “in the 
specific sense of the particular body of contract, tort, and property law” developed over 
centuries by Anglo-American courts, but rather “in the general sense of ‘law made initially 
by judges but subject to statutory override.’” Id. at 1469 n.10. 
 158. See id. at 1481. 
2014] CLOSE CORPORATIONS AND CONTRACEPTIVES 1969 
grant exemptions more generously, sound in the knowledge that the 
legislature possesses an additional level of review.159 
D.  An Overstep of Authority:  The Court Limits RFRA’s Reach 
Although Congress enacted RFRA with strong bipartisan support, the 
Supreme Court held that Congress exceeded its power by extending the 
law’s reach to local and state governments.160  In City of Boerne v. 
Flores,161 a Catholic church in Texas sought review of a local zoning board 
decision denying its application for a building permit.162  In response, the 
city challenged the constitutionality of the law.163  The Court explained that 
Congress relied on its enforcement power in section five of the Fourteenth 
Amendment,164 which Congress can use to address constitutional violations 
in the states.165  This enforcement power, however, has limits.166  Any 
enforcement mechanism passed pursuant to section five must actually 
enforce the Constitution, not substantively change its meaning.167  The 
Court defined this requirement by saying there must be congruence and 
proportionality between the injury the law seeks to prevent and the means it 
adopts to effect that end.168  Without congruence and proportionality, a 
legislative act effects a substantive change beyond enforcement.169  For 
RFRA, specifically, the Court found a dearth of examples where 
legislatures passed laws because of religious bigotry.170  Rather, the Court 
found that RFRA addressed occasional, incidental effects that general laws 
can have on religious exercise.171 
 
 159. See id. at 1487.  Critics of RFRA suggested that Congress asked the Court to do 
precisely what the Court rejected in Smith:  to engage in a balancing of religious claims with 
governmental interests.  For examples of such critiques, see id. at 1491 n.70 (quoting various 
scholars critiquing RFRA). 
 160. See generally City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); see also Christopher L. 
Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Congressional Power and Religious Liberty After City of 
Boerne v. Flores, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 79, 86–87. 
 161. 521 U.S. 507. 
 162. See id. at 511. 
 163. See id. at 517.  The Court’s analysis in Boerne appeared to limit the constitutional 
question to RFRA’s legitimacy as applied to state and local governments.  The Court later 
applied RFRA to the federal government in Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente 
Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006). 
 164. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (“The Congress shall have power to enforce, by 
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”). 
 165. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 517–18. 
 166. See id. at 518. 
 167. See id. at 519 (“Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by changing what 
the right is.”). 
 168. See id. at 520; see also Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 160, at 87. 
 169. See Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 160, at 88.  The Court confirmed this analysis by 
analyzing the history of the Fourteenth Amendment’s adoption, see Boerne, 521 U.S. at 
520–26, as well as its early section five jurisprudence. Id. at 524–25 (explaining that in The 
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), the Court held that section five allowed for legislation 
that corrects state constitutional violations, but does not allow general legislation). 
 170. See id. at 530. 
 171. Id. at 530–31 (citing examples from the legislative history, including “anecdotal 
evidence of autopsies performed . . . in violation of” certain religious beliefs). 
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RFRA, it held, was not proportional to what it sought to remedy.172  
Instead, its “[s]weeping coverage” included local, state, and federal laws 
without temporal limitation.173  For these reasons, the congruence and 
proportionality required by section five were not present.174  According to 
the Court and some scholars, this decision was necessary on federalism 
grounds because it protected the states from overweening action by the 
federal government.175  On the other hand, Justice Anthony Kennedy’s 
opinion elevated the Court’s interpretation of the Constitution above the 
interpretation of the other branches and gave little to support his assertions 
that the other branches cannot engage with the Court on the meaning of a 
constitutional provision.176 
The Court did note, however, that in its proper spheres of responsibility, 
Congress “has not just the right but the duty to make its own informed 
judgment on the meaning and force of the Constitution.”177  Thus, the 
Court’s precedent compelled the application of Smith in Boerne, but the 
Court’s reasoning left the possibility that if RFRA were enacted in 
accordance with Congress’s powers, then it could apply to the federal 
government.178  Boerne’s federalism rationale also inspired a wave of state 
analogues to RFRA that reflected what the Court stripped from the federal 
RFRA.179 
The Court confirmed RFRA’s applicability to federal laws and 
regulations in Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do 
Vegetal180. There, the Court entertained a claim by a Brazilian Christian 
Spiritist sect, O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegtal (UDV), 
seeking an exemption from the federal Controlled Substances Act181 (CSA).  
Part of the sect’s worship was ingesting hoasca, a tea brewed from two 
plants.182  One of the plants in the tea contained dimethyltryptamine, which 
the CSA classified as a Schedule I drug.183  The tea was central to UDV’s 
rituals, and banning it indisputably burdened the church’s religious 
exercise.184 
The Court explained that RFRA requires the government to justify a 
compelling interest to burden a person seeking an exemption.185  The 
 
 172. See id. at 532. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. at 533 (“The stringent test RFRA demands of state laws reflects a lack of 
proportionality or congruence between the means adopted and the legitimate end to be 
achieved.”). 
 175. See, e.g., Marci A. Hamilton, City of Boerne v. Flores, A Landmark for Structural 
Analysis, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 699, 711–12 (1998). 
 176. See ABNER S. GREENE, AGAINST OBLIGATION 238 (2012). 
 177. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 535. 
 178. Id. at 536. 
 179. See Volokh, supra note 56, at 1468 n.6 (compiling state analogues to RFRA). 
 180. 546 U.S. 418, 428 (2006). 
 181. See id. at 425 (citing 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–971 (2006)). 
 182. See id. 
 183. See 21 U.S.C. § 812(c) sched. 1(c)(6). 
 184. See Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 426. 
 185. See id. at 430. 
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government must state more than “broadly formulated interests,” and the 
Court “must searchingly examine” the government’s interests, as well as 
any impediments flowing from granting an exemption.186  This level of 
strict scrutiny results in a highly fact-intensive analysis for each claim.187  
In Gonzales, the Court held that the government’s argument for a 
compelling interest in uniform application of the law failed.188  The CSA 
contained a provision allowing for nonuniform enforcement, so the 
government could not claim uniform enforcement as a compelling 
interest.189  The Court thus found that the law could support exemptions 
and held that the application of the CSA to the 140 members of the UDV 
sect violated RFRA.190  RFRA granted the power of exemption to judges, 
and the Court used this power to exempt the UDV.191 
E.  Free Exercise Claims by Profit-Seeking Individuals and Corporations 
The Court has not yet used its RFRA exemption power to entertain a 
claim from a secular corporation.192  The Court has heard, however, free 
exercise claims from individuals involved in the pursuit of profit193 and 
corporations organized around religious ends.194  In addition, it has 
articulated a standard for applying First Amendment rights to corporations, 
which have long been considered “persons” in many aspects of statutory 
law.195  This section briefly explores each of these aspects. 
 
 
 186. Id. at 431 (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972)). 
 187. See id. at 430. 
 188. See id. at 434–37. 
 189. See id.  Similarly, a longstanding exemption on the use of peyote for religious 
purposes supported the argument that uniform application of the Controlled Substances Act 
was a weak argument.  It showed that Congress expected certain limitations on the Act and 
that the Act did not require uniform application. Id. at 434–35. 
 190. See id. at 438–39. 
 191. See id.  The Gonzales case did not challenge the constitutionality of RFRA, so 
whether the law violates the Establishment Clause or represents an overreach of Congress’s 
powers applied to the federal government is still a possible source of future litigation. 
 192. See Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 133 S. Ct. 641, 642 (2012) (Sotomayor, 
Circuit Justice) (denying application for an injunction pending appellate review). 
 193. See, e.g., Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (adjudicating a claim by 
merchants who believed a law burdened their religious exercise). 
 194. See, e.g., Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 425 (adjudicating free exercise claim by 
incorporated church group); Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 
U.S. 520 (1993) (same); see also Scott W. Gaylord, For-Profit Corporations, Free Exercise, 
and the HHS Mandate, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 40), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2237630. 
 195. See, e.g., First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978); see also Julie 
Marie Baworowsky, Note, From Public Square to Market Square:  Theoretical Foundations 
of First and Fourteenth Amendment Protection of Corporate Religious Speech, 83 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1713, 1723–47 (2008) (explaining three theories of corporations and the 
availability of corporate speech under each). 
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1.  Claims from Individuals in the Pursuit of Profit 
In several cases, the Supreme Court has heard free exercise challenges to 
laws that allegedly burdened the religion of individuals engaged in 
business.196  The Court decided Braunfeld v. Brown before it created the 
Sherbert regime, but it contained seeds of the compelling interest test.197  
The plaintiffs were Orthodox Jews who claimed that a law requiring their 
stores to close on Sundays violated their free exercise of religion; the 
plaintiffs already closed for the Sabbath on Saturdays, and would therefore 
lose further economic benefit.198  Although the Court accepted that this 
would be a result, it held that the state had a compelling interest in Sunday 
closing laws, and that the interest in a uniform day of rest outweighed the 
business owners’ free exercise claims.199 
In United States v. Lee,200 decided after Sherbert and Yoder, the Court 
examined the claims of an Old Order Amish farmer and carpenter who did 
not pay Social Security taxes for several employees on the grounds that the 
Amish faith forbids receipt of and contributions to Social Security.201  The 
Court held that the law burdened Lee’s religious exercise, but it also found 
that the government’s interest in a uniform Social Security system justified 
this burden.202  The Court distinguished the feasibility of exemptions from 
Social Security from Yoder, where the exemption was from an education 
system.203  In short, the Court found that exemptions from a tax system 
would be difficult to manage if myriad faith groups sought exemptions.204 
In these cases, an individual in his capacity as either an employee or an 
employer sought judicial protection from a law that burdened the exercise 
of his religion.205  Without that protection, the petitioners would face the 
choice of following the instructions of their religion and losing a 
government benefit, or abandoning their religion to gain a benefit.206 
 
 196. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 254 (1982); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 
U.S. 707, 710 (1981); Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 601. 
 197. See Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 603–04 (“[L]egislative power over mere opinion is 
forbidden but it may reach people’s actions when they are found to be in violation of 
important social duties or subversive of good order, even when the actions are demanded by 
one’s religion.”). 
 198. See id. at 601. 
 199. See id. at 608–09 (explaining that allowing an exemption from the single day of rest 
for business owners of other religions could create enforcement problems or unfair economic 
advantage); see also Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 435 (explaining the meaning of Braunfeld for the 
Court’s analysis of individual exemptions to state’s interests). 
 200. 455 U.S. 252. 
 201. See id. at 254–55. 
 202. See id. at 257–60. 
 203. Id. at 259–60. 
 204. See id. 
 205. See supra notes 196–204 and accompanying text; see also Korte v. Sebelius, 735 
F.3d 654, 679–81 (7th Cir. 2013). 
 206. See Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136, 144 (1987). 
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2.  Claims from Religious Nonprofit Corporations 
In addition to claims from individuals in the pursuit of profit, the 
Supreme Court has entertained claims from corporations organized for 
religious purposes, even though such nonprofit corporations do not pray, 
worship, or undertake any act independent of the individuals comprising 
them.207  Gonzales was the most recent RFRA claim by a nonprofit 
organization.208  There, the petitioner was a New Mexico corporation.209  
Thirteen years earlier, the Court heard a free exercise claim from a Florida 
nonprofit corporation in Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of 
Hialeah.210  The church in that case was part of the Santeria religion211 and 
sued the city over an ordinance forbidding the sacrifice of animals in the 
town.212  The Court held that such laws intentionally targeting religious 
exercise were not neutral, and therefore received strict scrutiny rather than 
Smith’s rational basis review.213  Ultimately, the law did not survive that 
level of scrutiny.214 
In each of the cases described in Part I.E.1 and I.E.2, the Court did not 
question whether the religious person or corporation had the ability to assert 
a claim.  Both individuals in the search of profit and corporations organized 
around religious principles could equally seek exemptions under the Free 
Exercise Clause, and a religious corporation could state a claim under 
RFRA.  The Court did not always grant such exemptions, but when it did, 
the availability of an exemption hinged on the balancing test rather than on 
who stated the claim. 
3.  Theories of the Corporation and Corporate First Amendment Claims 
American law regularly considers corporations to be “persons” for 
purposes of statutory construction.215  Corporations are separate legal 
entities with rights, obligations, and liabilities that are different from those 
of their owners and operators.216  The Court has explained that a 
 
 207. See Gaylord, supra note 194, at 55.  Rather, nonprofits act according to their 
directors’ instructions. See id. at 65. 
 208. See supra notes 180–91 and accompanying text. 
 209. Joint Appendix at 18, Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 
546 U.S. 418, 435 (2006) (No. 04-1084), 2005 WL 1628869 (reproducing plaintiff’s 
complaint). 
 210. 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
 211. See id. at 524. 
 212. See id. at 525–28 (explaining the town’s distaste for the religion’s practices of 
ritualistic animal slaughter and the process by which it created laws curtailing the practice). 
 213. See id. at 542–46. 
 214. Id. at 546. But cf. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 (1983) 
(rejecting a religious freedom claim on the grounds of compelling interest, not standing). 
 215. See, e.g., 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (defining the word “person” in the U.S. Code as 
inclusive of corporations, partnerships, trusts, and other entities unless the context of the law 
dictates otherwise); 18 AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 72 (2013); ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. 
GARNER, READING LAW 273 (2012) (explaining the artificial person canon of construction, 
which mirrors the Dictionary Act). 
 216. 1 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF 
CORPORATIONS § 1 (rev. vol. 2006). 
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corporation is “an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in 
contemplation of law.”217  Black’s Law Dictionary defines “corporation” as 
an entity “having authority under law to act as a single person distinct from 
the shareholders who own it and having rights to issue stock and exist 
indefinitely.”218  A corporation, therefore, is a separate legal entity with 
distinct rights and obligations and is the product of positive law.219  
Corporations do business through a board of directors, not through 
shareholders.220  Many corporations elect to make business decisions based 
on values and principles outside of the bottom line, and many corporations 
have adopted a theory of corporate social responsibility as a meaningful 
purpose of doing business.221 
A corporation might be a “person” for purposes of a statute if such a 
construction will give effect to the purpose or the spirit of the law.222  The 
U.S. Code recognizes this in the Dictionary Act223 by providing a rebuttable 
presumption that the word “person” in a statute includes corporations, and 
courts have held that a corporation does not literally need to be the actor for 
such statutes, because corporations do nothing without human actors.224  
Language imparting personhood to corporations has existed as long as 
corporations have,225 although the prevailing theories of corporations have 
changed.226  Three dominant theories of corporations include the artificial 
person theory, the contractual theory, and the real entity theory.227 
The artificial person theory was the earliest theory of corporations in 
American law.228  It taught that a corporation was an artificial entity created 
through legislative grant and controlled by the state for public reasons.229  
 
 217. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 517, 636 (1819). 
 218. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 391 (9th ed. 2009) (listing and defining numerous types 
of corporations). 
 219. See Thomas E. Rutledge, A Corporation Has No Soul—The Business Entity Law 
Response to Challenges to the PPACA Contraceptive Mandate, 5 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 
(forthcoming) (manuscript at 20–23), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2294582. But see 
Jonathan T. Tan, Comment, Nonprofit Organizations, For-Profit Corporations, and the HHS 
Mandate:  Why the Mandate Does Not Satisfy RFRA’s Requirements, 47 U. RICH. L. REV. 
1301, 1355 (2013) (arguing that the separate legal status of a corporation is true for both 
nonprofit and for-profit corporations). 
 220. See Rutledge, supra note 219, at 21; see also Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. 
Jackson, Jr., Corporate Political Speech:  Who Decides?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 83, 87 (2010). 
 221. See Rienzi, supra note 87, at 83–84 (providing the examples of Whole Foods and 
Chipotle that have adopted social purposes as part of their business platforms). 
 222. See FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 216, § 7.05. 
 223. 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
 224. See Jeremy M. Christiansen, Note, “The Word[] ‘Person’ . . . Includes 
Corporations”:  Why the Religious Freedom Restoration Act Protects Both For- and 
Nonprofit Corporations, 2013 UTAH L. REV 623, 645–46. 
 225. See Margaret M. Blair, Corporate Personhood and the Corporate Persona, 2013 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 785, 796. 
 226. See id. at 798–808 (explaining three theories of corporations). 
 227. See id. 
 228. See Katherine Lepard, Note, Standing Their Ground:  Corporations’ Fight for 
Religious Rights in Light of the Enactment of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
Contraceptive Coverage Mandate, 45 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1041, 1044 (2013). 
 229. See Baworowsky, supra note 195, at 1725. 
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Indeed, corporate charters frequently went to the politically connected 
elite.230  Under this theory, the corporation, with purposes dictated by the 
state, could not assert a claim against the entity that allowed its existence.231 
The contractual theory arose in backlash to the artificial person theory, 
which granted corporate status as a privilege.232  Corporations desired 
protection from the regulatory power of the government, so states created 
statutes through which individuals could join together and incorporate 
businesses to pursue legal business activities.233  This theory asserted that 
the sole goal of a corporation is profit234 and ostensibly viewed corporate 
rights as those of the individuals joined together for sake of the business.235  
The contractual theory crumbled, however, as publicly traded companies 
increased the number of shareholders involved in a business venture.236 
The real entity theory replaced the dying contractual theory and is a 
middle ground between the contractual and the artificial entity theories.237  
The theory accounts for the natural human inclination to associate and to 
form purposeful groups, and it holds that individual owners are different 
from the directors.238  Under this theory, a corporation can develop an 
identity, pursue certain purposes defined by its board of directors, and serve 
a mediating function in society between individuals and government.239 
The real entity theory provides a framework for conceiving corporations 
as more than mere profit-generating machines.240  Especially in closely held 
corporations,241 where individual owners also participate in the 
 
 230. See Blair, supra note 225, at 799. 
 231. See Baworowsky, supra note 195, at 1726. 
 232. See id. at 1727–28. 
 233. See id.; see also Blair, supra note 225, at 801–02. 
 234. See Baworowsky, supra note 195, at 1731; see also Conestoga Wood Specialties 
Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. the Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 724 F.3d 377, 385 (3d Cir.), 
cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013). 
 235. See Blair, supra note 225, at 804. 
 236. See id. 
 237. See Baworowsky, supra note 195, at 1736. 
 238. See id. at 1737 (calling the corporation “a new group body naturally forming from 
the cooperation of its individual members”); see also Blair, supra note 225, at 807 
(explaining that scholars and courts developed this theory to account for the shareholder 
becoming more of an investor than a owner). 
 239. See Baworowsky, supra note 195, at 1740–41 (citing ALEXIS DE TOQUEVILLE, 
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 180 (Harvey C. Mansfield & Delba Winthrop eds. & trans., Univ. 
of Chi. Press 2000) (1835)).  This position is far from gaining universal acceptance, 
however, as many view corporations as a source of economic inequality and societal 
injustice. See, e.g., Kent Greenfield, Daniel J.H. Greenwood & Erik S. Jaffe, Should 
Corporations Have First Amendment Rights?, 30 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 875, 877–81 (2007); 
We the People, Not We the Corporations, MOVE TO AMEND, https://movetoamend.org (last 
visited Feb. 24, 2014). 
 240. See Blair, supra note 225, at 819–20 (explaining that the existence of a corporate 
person is necessary for companies like Facebook and Google to achieve their goals of 
emphasizing “the importance of such factors as ‘culture’ and ‘reputation’ and 
‘innovativeness’ in the value creating process” rather than simply acting in accordance with 
a number of contracts). 
 241. See 1A FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 216, § 70.10 (rev. vol. 2002) (“Courts generally 
identify common law close corporations by three characteristics:  (1) a small number of 
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management of the company, a corporate identity can emerge from the 
deliberate actions of those directing the corporation.242  In the context of a 
company run by those sharing a religion, “these individuals can choose to 
maintain a religious identity.”243 
The Supreme Court has relied on each of these theories in its various 
decisions on corporate rights, so it is unclear which theory it will use to 
examine corporate exercise of religion under either the Constitution or 
RFRA.244  The best compass for its potential treatment of corporate religion 
is its treatment of corporate speech.245  In First National Bank of Boston v. 
Bellotti,246 the Court heard an argument by a corporation alleging that a 
Massachusetts statute restricting use of corporate funds to influence 
elections violated its free speech rights.247  At the outset of its analysis, the 
Court instructed that the proper framing of the question was not whether the 
corporation has the right, but rather whether the regulated activity was 
something “that the First Amendment was meant to protect.”248  Certain 
constitutional rights are “purely personal,” meaning that historically, only 
individuals received protection under that right.249  To determine whether 
the right was purely personal, the Court examined “the nature, history, and 
purpose of the particular constitutional provision.”250  In its analysis of the 
Free Speech Clause, the Court explained that First Amendment freedoms 
comprise “fundamental components of liberty” and that speech has no 
“separate source” when asserted by a corporation.251  Because of this, the 
Court held that the First Amendment protected the bank and struck down 
the state statute as unconstitutional.252 
The Court recently upheld Bellotti in Citizens United v. Federal Election 
Commission.253  The Citizens United Court held that the Free Speech 
Clause protects a corporation’s ability to speak in the electoral context.254  
Specifically, it overturned a statute that limited corporate expenditures on 
 
shareholders; (2) no ready market for corporate stock; and (3) active shareholder 
participation in the business.”). 
 242. See Baworowsky, supra note 195, at 1744. 
 243. Id. 
 244. See Lepard, supra note 228, at 1046. 
 245. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom 
of speech.”). 
 246. 435 U.S. 765 (1978). 
 247. See id. at 767–69. 
 248. Id. at 776; see also Gaylord, supra note 194, at 30.  In Bellotti, the Court explained 
that the issue was whether “the corporate identity of the speaker deprives this proposed 
speech of what otherwise would be its clear entitlement to protection.” Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 
778. 
 249. See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 778 n.14 (citing United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698–
701 (1944), for the example that the right against self-incrimination applied only to 
individuals). 
 250. See id. 
 251. See id. at 780. 
 252. See id. at 795. 
 253. 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 254. See id. at 365. 
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speech related to elections.255  Justice Anthony Kennedy explained that the 
First Amendment’s protections extend to corporations and that Bellotti’s 
holding means that corporate speech does not lose constitutional protection 
merely because it comes from a corporation.256  In the corporate context, 
political speech decisions are made by directors through “the same rules as 
ordinary business decisions.”257  In Citizens United, the corporation was a 
nonprofit, but the Court explicitly stated that the Constitution forbids 
suppression of the freedom of speech, regardless of whether the corporation 
is for profit or not for profit.258 
The Citizens United holding reflected two views of corporate 
personhood:  that corporations possess the aggregate rights of their 
shareholders and that corporations possess autonomous rights separate from 
their shareholders.259  The Court used the aggregate rights theory to 
determine that corporations are essentially associations of individuals and 
that restrictions on corporate speech are not permissible simply because the 
source of the speech is a corporation.260  The Court also used the entity 
theory of corporations by explaining that corporate political speech can 
have value in the marketplace of ideas.261  Thus, under either theory, the 
First Amendment protects corporate speech. 
F.  A New Challenge:  The Affordable Care Act and Its Perceived Threat to 
Religious Liberty 
Current litigation alleges that certain provisions of the Affordable Care 
Act substantially burden the free exercise of religion by those who provide 
insurance plans to employees and students.262  The Affordable Care Act 
requires group insurance plans provided by employers to ensure certain 
levels of health services, including coverage without cost-sharing of 
preventive care and screenings for women, according to regulations 
promulgated by the Health Resource and Services Administration (HRSA) 
and HHS.263  HHS sought the recommendations of the Institute of Medicine 
(IOM), an arm of the National Academy of Sciences, to define guidelines 
 
 255. See id. at 365–66. 
 256. See id. at 342. 
 257. See Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 220, at 87. 
 258. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365. 
 259. See Anne Tucker, Flawed Assumptions:  A Corporate Law Analysis of Free Speech 
and Corporate Personhood in Citizens United, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 497, 502–03 
(2010). 
 260. See id. at 519; see also Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 342 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of 
Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784 (1978)). 
 261. See Tucker, supra note 259, at 516–17; see also Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 364 
(“On certain topics corporations may possess valuable expertise, leaving them the best 
equipped to point out errors or fallacies in speech of all sorts, including the speech of 
candidates and elected officials.”). 
 262. See infra Part II.  For an overview of litigation in the federal district courts and the 
early stages of appellate litigation, see generally Tan, supra note 219. 
 263. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (Supp. V 2011); 29 U.S.C. § 1185d. 
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for women’s preventive care and screening.264  The IOM recommended that 
any FDA-approved contraceptive method be part of the coverage,265 and 
HHS adopted this recommendation in its rulemaking process.266 
The FDA has approved twenty contraceptive methods.267  These include 
barrier methods (such as condoms), hormonal methods (such as oral 
contraceptives), emergency contraception (such as Plan B or ella), 
implanted devices (such as intrauterine devices (IUDs)), and permanent 
methods (such as vasectomies).268 
The ACA and the regulatory agencies enforcing it have provided 
authority for the HRSA to exempt religious employers from complying 
with this law if they object to providing contraception.269  The regulation 
provides that a “religious employer” is an organization that:  (1) has a 
purpose of inculcating religious values, (2) primarily employs those who 
share its religious tenets, (3) primarily serves those who share its religious 
tenets, and (4) meets the Internal Revenue Code’s definition of a nonprofit 
organization.270  For these reasons, it does not cover for-profit corporations, 
including closely held corporations.271 
Like religious nonprofit corporations, some for-profit corporations also 
state religious objections to providing contraception on the grounds that 
some methods can cause a fertilized egg to fail to implant in the uterus and 
that this is equivalent to facilitating an elective abortion.272  The methods to 
which plaintiffs in the Tenth Circuit object, for example, include Plan B, 
ella, and two IUDs.273  Other methods, which simply prevent fertilization, 
may not be objectionable, depending on the religious background of the 
plaintiff.274  There is medical and scientific debate concerning whether 
these devices actually prevent implantation, but in Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. 
v. Sebelius,275 the government conceded that certain contraceptive methods 
 
 264. See Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1123 (10th Cir.) (en 
banc), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013). 
 265. See id. 
 266. See Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of 
Preventive Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 
8725, 8725 (Feb. 15, 2012) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 147).   
 267. See Birth Control:  Medicines To Help You, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/ForConsumers/ByAudience/ForWomen/FreePublications/ucm313215.ht
m (last visited Feb. 24, 2014). 
 268. Id. 
 269. See 45 C.F.R. § 147.130(1)(a)(iv)(A) (2013). 
 270. Id. § 147.130(1)(a)(iv)(B). 
 271. See id. 
 272. See, e.g., Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1124–25 (10th Cir.) 
(en banc), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013). 
 273. See id. 
 274. See Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of the U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. 
Servs., 724 F.3d 377, 381–82 (3d Cir.) (explaining that the Mennonite plaintiffs object to 
providing Plan B and ella), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013); Univ. of Notre Dame v. 
Sebelius, No. 3:12-CV-253(RLM), 2012 WL 6756332, at *1 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 31, 2012) 
(explaining that the Catholic plaintiffs object to all “abortifacients, contraception (when 
prescribed for contraceptive purposes), and sterilization”). 
 275. 723 F.3d 1114. 
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can prevent uterine implantation, rendering a full scientific analysis 
unnecessary.276  Nevertheless, amici to the Tenth Circuit disagreed about 
the effect that Plan B, ella, and IUDs have on ovulation, conception, and 
implantation.277  In the brief for the Physicians for Reproductive Health and 
other groups, amici explained that the scientific and legal definition of 
pregnancy is implantation in the uterine lining, which can occur up to five 
to nine days after fertilization of an egg by a sperm.278  Because the 
emergency contraceptives at issue in Hobby Lobby almost always act before 
implantation, labeling the methods “abortifacients” was improper.279  Amici 
also explained that a copper, FDA-approved IUD creates a toxic 
environment for sperm and that any changes to the endometrial lining 
would only prevent, not disrupt, the implantation necessary to create a 
scientific pregnancy.280  In contrast, amici for the plaintiff explained that 
FDA-approved contraceptive methods might prevent either conception or 
implantation.281  These amici explained various studies in an effort to 
persuade the court that certain contraceptive methods might prevent 
implantation of a fertilized cell.282  For example, they cited studies showing 
that ella has the potential to impair or prevent a fertilized egg from 
implanting in the uterine wall.283  They also argued that the scientific 
definition of pregnancy as a fully implanted embryo does not negate the fact 
that certain contraceptive methods might prevent the implantation of an 
embryo.284  The plaintiffs in the HHS mandate litigation have stated that 
their opposition to the HHS regulation is that it requires them to pay for 
contraception that they believe can cause the death of a fertilized 
embryo.285 
The plaintiffs in these cases claim that requiring them to pay even part of 
the fees for insurance plans that cover contraception constitutes a 
substantial burden on the exercise of their religion.286  The Hobby Lobby 
plaintiffs, for example, stated that their religion barred causing the death of 
an embryo, and, by extension, providing certain contraceptives that could 
cause an embryo to fail to implant.287  The regulation imposes a burden 
 
 276. See id. at 1123 n.3. 
 277. Compare Brief for Physicians for Reproductive Health et al. As Amici Curiae 
Supporting Appellees, Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d 1114 (No. 12-6294), 2013 WL 1291178 
[hereinafter Brief for Physicians for Reproductive Health et al.], with Brief for Ass’n of 
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Lobby, 723 F.3d 1114 (No. 12-6294), 2013 WL 656598 [hereinafter Brief for Ass’n of 
American Physicians & Surgeons et al.]. 
 278. See Brief for Physicians for Reproductive Health et al., supra note 277, at *9–10. 
 279. Id. at *11–16. 
 280. See id. at *16. 
 281. See Brief for Ass’n of American Physicians & Surgeons et al., supra note 277, at *6. 
 282. See id. at *7–14. 
 283. See id. at *11. 
 284. See id. *7–14. 
 285. See Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1122 (10th Cir.) (en 
banc), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013). 
 286. See Brief of Appellants at 20, Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d 1114 (No. 12-6294), 2013 WL 
656599, at *20. 
 287. See Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1140. 
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because it requires the company to participate in an activity prohibited by a 
sincere religious belief, or, at the very least, substantially pressures the 
company to act contrary to sincere religious beliefs.288  Such pressure 
comes as a result of large, annual fines for a corporation that fails to comply 
with the regulation.289  The government, in contrast, argues that the 
regulation’s burden is too attenuated to be a substantial burden because the 
requirement is to provide many types of insurance and because the decision 
to use contraceptives is between a woman and her doctor.290 
II.  DISSENSION IN THE RANKS:  THE CIRCUITS DIFFER ON CORPORATE 
RFRA CLAIMS 
The HHS mandate cases have led to deeply fractured opinions in the 
circuits.291  For-profit corporate plaintiffs have sought injunctions against 
application of the HHS mandate to varying degrees of success.292  Some 
courts have found that corporations will not succeed on a RFRA claim.293  
Other courts have found the possibility of success.294  The major source of 
conflict is whether corporations are “persons” exercising religion.  The 
answer to this question is crucial, as RFRA contemplates strict scrutiny of 
laws that substantially burden a person’s religion.  The issue in these cases, 
then, is a matter of statutory interpretation of the term “person” in RFRA.295  
This Part examines four circuits’ answers to this question.  The Tenth and 
Seventh Circuits each held that secular corporations may state claims under 
RFRA.296  In contrast, the Third Circuit held that corporations could not 
exercise religion, barring them from stating claims under RFRA.297  The 
D.C. Circuit fell between these two approaches, holding that individual 
plaintiffs may state the RFRA claims of a closely held corporation.298 
 
 288. See Brief of Appellants, supra note 286, at *20–21. 
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 291. See, e.g., Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1114 (sitting en banc and resulting in six 
different opinions). 
 292. Among other factors, a litigant seeking a preliminary injunction must prove a 
likelihood of success on the merits of the claim. See, e.g., Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. 
v. Sec’y of U.S. the Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 724 F.3d 377, 382 (3d Cir.), cert. 
granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013). 
 293. See generally Conestoga Wood, 724 F.3d at 377; Autocam Corp. v. Sebelius, 730 
F.3d 618 (6th Cir. 2013); Eden Foods, Inc. v. Sebelius, 733 F.3d 626 (6th Cir. 2013). 
 294. See generally Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2013); Gilardi v. U.S. Dep’t 
of Health & Human Servs., 733 F.3d 1208 (D.C. Cir. 2013); Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1114. 
 295. See Korte, 735 F.3d at 682.  An additional question is whether the distinction 
between for-profit and nonprofit corporations is relevant for RFRA. See id. at 674–76. 
 296. See infra Part II.A. 
 297. See infra Part II.B. 
 298. See infra Part II.C. 
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A.  The Tenth and Seventh Circuits Hold That a For-Profit Corporation 
May State a Claim Under RFRA 
The Tenth and the Seventh Circuit each held that for-profit corporate 
plaintiffs were “persons” exercising religion and therefore protected by 
RFRA.  This section examines each circuit’s opinion. 
1.  The Tenth Circuit Finds That RFRA Protects Corporations Through a 
Textual Analysis 
In Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius,299 the Court considered a RFRA 
claim brought by Hobby Lobby Stores, a chain of craft stores; Mardel, Inc., 
a chain of book stores; and the family members who own both 
corporations.300  Together, these corporations employed over 13,000 
people.301  Five members of the Green family owned and ran both chains 
according to their Christian beliefs, as described in Hobby Lobby’s 
statement of purpose, which recited the family’s commitment to operating 
their business according to biblical principles.302  Their managerial 
decisions stemmed from their faith.303  For example, the stores did not open 
on Sundays, and Hobby Lobby placed evangelistic advertisements in 
newspapers.304  Moreover, their corporate structure included a management 
trust that had religious requirements:  “The trust exists ‘to honor God with 
all that has been entrusted’ to the Greens and to ‘use the Green family assets 
to create, support, and leverage the efforts of Christian ministries.’”305 
The plaintiffs objected to the HHS mandate because their faith included 
the belief that the fertilization of an egg by a sperm is the beginning of 
human life and that facilitating acts that cause a human embryo to die was 
immoral.306  In light of this belief, the plaintiffs sought relief from 
enforcement of the mandate as applied to four307 of the FDA-approved 
contraceptive methods that they believed prevented uterine implantation.308  
If Hobby Lobby and Mardel failed to comply with the regulation, each 
would be exposed to tax penalties, regulatory activity, and possible 
lawsuits.309  The regulatory taxes, for example, would amount to $100 per 
day for each uncovered individual.310  Because the plan covered more than 
 
 299. 723 F.3d 1114. 
 300. See id. 1120. 
 301. See id. at 1122. 
 302. See id. 
 303. See id. 
 304. See id. 
 305. See id.   
 306. See id. at 1122–23. 
 307. The plaintiffs did not object to contraception generally, as a Catholic organization 
might, see supra note 18, but rather objected only to four of the twenty FDA-approved 
methods. See Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1144.   
 308. See Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1125.  The government did not dispute the sincerity of 
this belief. See id. 
 309. See id. (citing 26 U.S.C. §§ 4980D, 4980H (Supp. V 2011); 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132, 
1185d). 
 310. See id. (citing 26 U.S.C. § 4980D(b)(1)). 
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13,000 individuals, this would be a fine of almost $475 million annually.311  
Alternatively, the plaintiffs could have eliminated health insurance 
coverage and would face penalties of $26 million annually.312 
a.  Statutory Analysis Indicates That RFRA’s “Person” 
Includes Corporations 
The Tenth Circuit held that the corporate plaintiffs were “persons” who 
may state a claim under RFRA, and a plurality found that these plaintiffs 
were likely to succeed on the merits of their claim.313  The government 
advanced two arguments that Hobby Lobby and Mardel did not fall under 
RFRA’s scope.  First, it argued that the existence of religious exemptions 
for nonprofit organizations in civil rights and labor laws indicated that 
Congress intended RFRA to carry forward a distinction between for-profit 
and nonprofit organizations.314  Second, the government argued that the for-
profit/nonprofit distinction came from the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence 
and that Congress did not intend for RFRA to expand the Free Exercise 
Clause’s scope.315 
The court rejected both arguments as a matter of statutory 
interpretation.316  Because RFRA did not specifically define “person,” the 
court relied on the Dictionary Act’s default definition, which includes 
corporations unless the statute’s context dictates otherwise.317  Contrary to 
the government’s position, RFRA’s context did not include statutes that 
explicitly provided only for religious nonprofit exemptions.318  The court 
explained that exemptions for religious organizations in such acts as Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964319 and the Americans with Disabilities 
Act320 (ADA) show that Congress “knows how to craft a corporate 
religious exemption.”321  The court claimed that to state that Congress 
intended to carry forward Title VII and the ADA’s distinction without 
expressly providing so is to strain the text.322  Thus, the default Dictionary 
Act definition applied, and RFRA protected the corporate plaintiffs.323 
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 312. See id. (citing 26 U.S.C. § 4980H). 
 313. Id. at 1120–21.  The Tenth Circuit remanded to the district court to evaluate the 
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 314. See Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1128–29. 
 315. See id. 
 316. See id. at 1129. 
 317. See id.; see also 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
 318. See Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1129–30. 
 319. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006). 
 320. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2006 & Supp. II 2008). 
 321. See Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1130; cf. Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 676 (7th 
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 322. See Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1129–30.  The Court characterized this reading this 
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shorthand for something like ‘natural person or ‘religious organization’ as that term was 
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b.  Constitutional Principles of Free Exercise Do Not Require Excluding 
For-Profit Corporations From RFRA’s Protection 
The court next addressed the argument that Congress’s understanding of 
the Free Exercise Clause informed its passage of RFRA, and that this 
understanding precluded protection of for-profit corporations.324  The court 
rejected this analysis on the grounds that RFRA’s purpose was to restore 
the pre-Smith balancing test for whether a neutral law of general 
applicability can withstand a strict scrutiny analysis to justifiably burden 
religious exercise.325  Congress did not intend to alter who could bring a 
claim under pre-Smith free exercise jurisprudence, which included the 
guarantee to protect associations and not just individuals.326  The protection 
of associational freedom is important for protecting other individual 
liberties.327  Moreover, the First Amendment protects such associations as 
churches, which incorporate.328 
The court rejected the government’s bright-line approach that precludes a 
RFRA claim for a corporation that does not have nonprofit status through 
the Internal Revenue Service.329  This, the court explained, cannot be a 
position rooted in the First Amendment, because its drafters rejected the 
term “conscience” in favor of “exercise.”330  The chosen term carried a 
connotation of action and thus protected “religiously motivated conduct, as 
well as religious belief.”331  In light of this action-oriented history, the court 
rejected the argument that incorporation alters First Amendment rights 
while individuals maintain protection.332  The court also rejected the district 
court’s argument that a business corporation cannot partake in “religiously-
motivated actions separate and apart from the intention and direction of 
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their individual actors.”333  This could not be right, according to the court, 
because churches and other entities that incorporate clearly exercise 
religion.334  RFRA thus includes corporations in its definitions, because the 
for-profit/nonprofit distinction is irrelevant. 
2.  The Seventh Circuit Agreed That a Secular Corporation Could Invoke 
RFRA’s Protection 
Using a similar analysis to the Hobby Lobby court, the Seventh Circuit 
held that secular corporations could challenge the HHS mandate.335  In 
Korte v. Sebelius,336 the court heard a consolidated appeal involving two 
for-profit corporations.337  The first, Korte & Luitjohan Contractors, Inc., 
was a closely held construction company that employs ninety full-time 
workers.338  Cyril and Jane Korte were the majority shareholders of K&L 
Contractors, as well as its only officers and directors.339  As Catholics, they 
believed that artificial contraception and abortifacient drugs were contrary 
to their religion and objected to providing any health plan that facilitated 
the use of such contraceptive methods.340  To emphasize this objection, the 
couple, acting in their managerial capacity, enacted ethical guidelines 
describing limits on employee healthcare benefits.341  Failing to comply 
with the HHS mandate would result in penalties totaling $730,000 
annually.342 
In the second case, the corporate plaintiffs were Grote Industries, Inc., 
which acted as the managing member for Grote Industries, LLC, which 
manufactures vehicle safety systems.343  Six individually named plaintiffs, 
along with other family members, fully owned Grote Industries, Inc.344  The 
individual plaintiffs were the officers and directors of the corporation.345  
Grote Industries employed 464 employees in the United States and 
provided a self-insured healthcare plan that did not carry contraception and 
sterilization procedures before the HHS mandate became law.346  The 
plaintiffs managed Grote in accordance with their Catholic faith, objected to 
the mandate in light of that faith, and would face an annual penalty of 
nearly $17 million for failing to comply.347 
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Judge Diane S. Sykes began her opinion by explaining the breadth of 
RFRA, including its applicability to all federal law unless Congress 
explicitly excludes application of RFRA to a statute.348  RFRA, she 
explained, should alleviate “the inevitable clashes between religious 
freedom and the realities of the modern welfare state.”349  Against this 
backdrop, the court examined the meaning of “person” in RFRA by 
invoking the Dictionary Act.350  In its analysis, the court sought to 
determine whether allowing secular corporations to be “persons” for RFRA 
would be a poor fit with the statute’s purposes, and it held that because 
some corporations qualify for RFRA protection, the corporations in this 
litigation could qualify as well.351  As evidence of this claim, the court 
pointed to Gonzales,352 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc.,353 and the 
HHS mandate exemption for religious organizations.354  Like the Tenth 
Circuit, Judge Sykes rejected the government’s argument that RFRA 
carried forward the for-profit/nonprofit distinction within Title VII and the 
ADA.355 
Instead, the court examined the history of RFRA and free exercise more 
broadly to see if any pre-Smith cases rejected secular corporations’ ability 
to exercise religion.356  Recognizing that the question of secular corporate 
religious exercise was novel,357 the Korte court nonetheless explained that 
unless something about seeking profit hinders the ability to practice 
religion, “a faith-based, for-profit corporation can claim free-exercise 
protection to the extent that an aspect of its conduct is religiously 
motivated.”358  An examination of Thomas, Sherbert, Braunfeld, and Lee 
showed that individuals in the pursuit of profit had their claims examined 
by the Supreme Court—not for standing, but on the merits of the 
argument.359 
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The court further rejected the government’s argument by rebuking its 
attempt to cast United States v. Lee as dispositive of the claim that for-profit 
corporations cannot pursue religious exercise.360  The Lee Court stated: 
Congress and the courts have been sensitive to the needs flowing from the 
Free Exercise Clause, but every person cannot be shielded from all the 
burdens incident to exercising every aspect of the right to practice 
religious beliefs.  When followers of a particular sect enter into 
commercial activity as a matter of choice, the limits they accept on their 
own conduct as a matter of conscience and faith are not to be 
superimposed on the statutory schemes which are binding on others in 
that activity.361 
Judge Sykes called the government’s interpretation of this passage “a far-
too-narrow view of religious freedom,” because it assumes that the religious 
believer compartmentalizes his or her life.362 
Having explained that neither the Supreme Court’s free exercise 
jurisprudence nor RFRA’s text precluded for-profit corporate religious 
exercise, the court turned to the Supreme Court’s “general jurisprudence of 
corporate constitutional rights” and found that nothing automatically limits 
such rights to nonprofit corporations.363  The Korte court took note of the 
Supreme Court’s decisions granting and withholding certain constitutional 
rights to all corporations364 and explained that Bellotti was the closest thing 
to a proper decision framework.365  Namely, if the right in question has a 
historical function of guaranteeing rights to individuals only, the provision 
in question will not be available to corporations.366  Because the issue at 
bar, however, was strictly statutory, the court declined to further analyze the 
free exercise rights of the corporate plaintiffs.367 
Based on all of these findings, the Korte court held that K&L Contractors 
and Grote Industries could state RFRA claims.368  In dicta, the court 
seemed to limit its holding to closely held corporations, because the 
individual owners set company policy as its directors, and they are 
intimately involved in directing the company.369  Both the Seventh and the 
Tenth Circuits, therefore, held that RFRA covered corporate claimants in 
light of the statute’s text and purpose. 
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2014] CLOSE CORPORATIONS AND CONTRACEPTIVES 1987 
B.  The Third Circuit Holds That a For-Profit Corporation Cannot 
Exercise Religion 
In contrast to the Hobby Lobby and Korte courts, the Third Circuit 
disagreed that for-profit corporations receive RFRA’s protection.370  In 
Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Secretary of the U.S. Department of 
Health & Human Services,371 the individual plaintiffs were members of the 
Hahn family, which was Mennonite.372  The family owned 100 percent of 
the shares of a corporation that manufactured wood cabinets and employed 
950 workers.373  As Mennonites, the Hahns believed that it was intrinsically 
evil and a sin to take a human life, including the termination of a fertilized 
embryo.374  In light of this belief, the Hahns and Conestoga objected to 
providing Plan B and ella, which the plaintiffs believed could cause a 
fertilized embryo to fail to implant in a woman’s uterus.375 
1.  The Third Circuit Rejects For-Profit Corporations’ Ability To Exercise 
Religion Under the First Amendment 
The Third Circuit began its analysis with the issue of whether 
corporations can exercise religion under the First Amendment.  The 
plaintiffs suggested two theories:  (1) that a corporation can exercise 
religion directly under the First Amendment, and (2) that a corporation can 
exercise religion indirectly by asserting the owners’ rights under a theory 
established by the Ninth Circuit.376 
a.  The Direct Exercise of Religion by a Corporation 
Conestoga premised its direct exercise theory on Citizens United, which 
held that the First Amendment applied to corporations in the context of a 
free speech case.377  Corporations may exercise a number of constitutional 
rights,378 but the guarantee must not be one that is “purely personal.”379  
The Third Circuit examined Bellotti’s relationship to Citizens United and 
explained that the latter’s holding was specific to the Court’s history of 
protecting corporate free speech.380  Moreover, free speech cases pose a 
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separate analytical and interpretive framework than free exercise cases.381  
The Conestoga court, therefore, found that Bellotti had no influence on the 
HHS mandate cases.382  For these reasons, it found that Bellotti’s “nature, 
history, and purpose” test was not met for corporate free exercise rights.383 
The court particularly emphasized a corporation’s inability to hold 
religious beliefs.384  In addition, it distinguished cases relied on in the 
petitioners’ and dissent’s arguments that showed recent Supreme Court 
cases allowing free exercise claims by religious organizations.385  These 
cases were inapposite for the majority because none involved a for-profit 
corporation.386  Religious organizations are a means through which 
individuals can practice their religion, and that such organizations receive 
protection within the Free Exercise Clause is not determinative for for-
profit corporations.387 
b.  The Third Circuit Rejects the Ninth Circuit’s Pass-Through Method 
After dispensing with the plaintiffs’ first theory, the Court examined their 
second theory.  The plaintiffs cited two cases from the Ninth Circuit388 that 
allowed closely held corporations to state the free exercise claims of their 
owners.389  Under this “pass-through theory,” the Ninth Circuit explained 
that closely held corporations may convey by extension the beliefs of the 
family members who own them.390  The corporate plaintiffs in these cases 
did not have any free exercise rights separate from or greater than their 
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owners’ rights.391 The Third Circuit rejected this analysis, claiming it rested 
on a faulty analysis of the corporate form, which creates a distinct entity.392  
In exchange for limited liability, the corporate owner gives up certain 
prerogatives.393  The pass-through theory, in contrast, ignores this separate 
legal entity.394  On this basis, the Third Circuit found that the pass-through 
theory was legally incorrect, and that the mandate’s burden falls squarely on 
Conestoga and not the Hahns.395  Because Conestoga itself cannot exercise 
religion, it has no free exercise recourse to seek an exemption from the 
mandate.396 
2.  The Third Circuit Rejects Corporate Personhood for Purposes of RFRA 
The Third Circuit also rejected Conestoga’s ability to state a RFRA claim 
with a brief, plain-language analysis.  Because the statute is for a “person’s 
exercise of religion,” and because the court held that a corporation cannot 
exercise religion under the Free Exercise Clause,397 it also held that a 
corporation is unable to state a claim under RFRA.398 
C.  The D.C. Circuit Holds That the Owners of a Closely Held Corporation 
Can Assert a RFRA Claim on Behalf of the Corporation 
In Gilardi v. United States Department of Health & Human Services,399 
the D.C. Circuit held that the individual plaintiffs who owned the corporate 
plaintiff could state a RFRA claim on behalf of their corporation, although 
it rejected the Ninth Circuit’s pass-through theory.400  The individual 
plaintiffs were two brothers who owned two companies equally.401  
Freshway Foods and Freshway Logistics together employed 400 people, 
who could participate in a self-insured health plan.402  As Catholics, the 
Gilardi brothers opposed the coverage mandated by the HHS regulation, but 
failure to provide it to their employers would result in fines amounting to 
over $14 million annually.403 
Judge Janice Rogers Brown first analyzed whether the corporate 
plaintiffs could state a claim under RFRA.404  She took note of the Hobby 
Lobby court’s opinion but explained that its analysis of the term “person,” 
relying on the Dictionary Act, was too narrow.405  Rather, she explained, 
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the proper focus is on a “person’s exercise of religion”406 rather than 
“person” alone.407  The court therefore examined the full free exercise 
jurisprudence to determine the “nature, history, and purpose” of the Free 
Exercise Clause and whether it applied to a secular corporation.408  Noting 
that the clause protected “exercise” rather than merely “conscience,”409 the 
court found that the clause’s protection extended to conduct undertaken 
either individually or institutionally.410  Indeed, the clause regularly 
protected individuals and religious organizations.411  No Supreme Court 
case had yet held, however, that a secular corporation could exercise 
religion.412  The Gilardi court thus refused to extend the free exercise right 
directly to the secular corporations, even if corporations might receive that 
right in the future.413  Here, Judge Brown noted that Citizens United was 
the culmination of decades of case law.414  The free exercise cases, on the 
other hand, militated against extending the free exercise right directly to 
corporations.415 
Like the Third Circuit, the D.C. Circuit rejected the Ninth Circuit’s pass-
through theory416 as legally “dubious.”417  Rather, the court held that the 
Gilardis have standing to sue because they are shareholders of the 
corporation injured separately from the corporation, and because the 
corporation did not have the capacity to sue for relief separately.418  
Although the government argued that incorporation always involves 
creating a distinct legal entity for which the owners forego certain rights, 
the court explained that an important part of this rights bargain is that 
corporations “can generally exercise some analogue of the forgone 
right.”419  In the case of free exercise, then, if the corporation cannot 
exercise that right, the shareholder should not give up the right upon 
incorporation.420  To hold otherwise would cause an important right to 
“disappear[] into the ether” depending on how a person ran his or her 
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business.421  Judge Brown rejected the government’s argument because she 
could not believe that Congress intended free exercise rights to disappear 
when it instituted RFRA’s compelling interest balancing test.422 
III.  FINDING THE PROPER FRAMEWORK:  PUTTING STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION BEFORE CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 
This Note proposes two approaches for the issue of whether secular 
corporations are “persons” protected by RFRA.  First, agreeing with the 
Tenth and Seventh Circuits, it proposes that the absence of case law 
examining free exercise claims by for-profit corporations is not, as some 
suggest, dispositive of the cases currently under review in the federal 
courts.423  Based on the Dictionary Act’s “context” requirement and a 
proper Bellotti analysis, certain for-profit corporations should be able to 
state RFRA claims, and the federal courts should continue building a 
jurisprudence to determine the contours of such claims.  Second, this Note 
proposes that even if the Supreme Court completely forecloses the 
possibility for any corporation to have rights under RFRA, the D.C. 
Circuit’s approach to allowing the shareholders to state a claim under 
RFRA is correct, because it comports with the nation’s broad protections of 
religious freedom in accordance with formal theories of corporate law.424 
A.  The Context of RFRA and the Nature, History, and Purpose of the Free 
Exercise Clause Do Not Preclude Corporate RFRA Claims 
RFRA is a “super-statute” implementing Congress’s interpretation of the 
Free Exercise Clause by incorporating a particular jurisprudence of the 
Supreme Court.425  Interpreters of the statute, then, must be careful not to 
intertwine the necessary statutory and constitutional analyses.  Courts will 
properly take notice of pre-Smith jurisprudence and adjudicate the HHS 
mandate cases according to principles of substantial burden and compelling 
interests that are outside the scope of this Note.426  In terms of who can 
bring claims under the statute, however, RFRA’s terms must govern, and 
RFRA grants judicial relief to persons burdened in their religious 
exercise.427  Unless the government can rebut the Dictionary Act’s 
presumption that the word “person” includes corporations, the corporate 
plaintiffs should be able to directly state RFRA claims.428  This section 
explains why congressional intent, textual interpretation, and legislative 
history support corporations’ ability to state RFRA claims and concludes 
that the federal judiciary should begin developing a jurisprudence of 
corporate RFRA rights. 
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1.  Context Matters:  Congress’s Intent To Restore the Pre-Smith Regime 
Determining who are the “persons” exercising religion under RFRA 
requires a proper statutory analysis.  This Note suggests that the analytic 
frameworks of the Seventh and Tenth Circuits and the Third Circuit present 
opposite forms of analysis, and that the former frames the issue correctly.  
The Hobby Lobby and Korte courts first approached the HHS mandate issue 
by determining what RFRA protected and then by analyzing its text and 
purpose.429  In contrast, the Conestoga court proceeded directly to the Free 
Exercise Clause, determined that the clause failed the Bellotti test for 
protecting corporations, and determined that corporations could receive 
neither constitutional nor statutory protection.430  The framework matters 
because RFRA appears to place a wider fence around religious liberty than 
the Smith Court did in its explanation of the Free Exercise Clause.431  In 
theory, this will help religious actors avoid clashes between their beliefs 
and the regulatory state.432 
The context of a RFRA analysis should include an understanding of what 
the statute aimed to restore.433  From Sherbert to Smith, the courts engaged 
in an enterprise that looked similar to a common law adjudicative 
process434 that entertained individual claims, resulting in a jurisprudence 
that later courts could apply.435  Unlike a true common law system, 
however, the Sherbert line of cases carried the imprimatur of constitutional 
prescription.436  The Smith Court rejected the Sherbert compelling interest 
test in part because it believed that judges were not suited to make the type 
of case-by-case balancing determinations required by Sherbert.437  Using its 
own considered judgment of the Constitution, Congress enacted RFRA 
against the background of Smith precisely to instruct courts that they should 
make such determinations in the first instance, because Congress believed 
that Smith would not otherwise provide satisfactory protection of 
Americans’ religious liberty.438  To rectify the wrong it perceived, 
Congress’s legislation instructed courts to use a balancing test that 
measured the government’s compelling interest against the alleged burden 
on believers’ exercise of their religion.439  This concept of legislative 
accommodation has existed since colonial days440 and reinforces the 
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American dedication to religious liberty beyond mere toleration.441  In 
addition, it mirrors the understanding—again dating from colonial times—
that compelling government interests justify burdening religious 
exercise.442 
RFRA thus restores not only the strict scrutiny regime articulated in 
Sherbert and Yoder, but also restores the common law model in which 
courts can and should examine particular claims in light of previous 
claims.443  This determination involves asking whether the new claim is 
similar enough to previous claims, and, if so, to extend the law’s 
protection.444  If it is not similar enough, a court can distinguish and dismiss 
the claim.  Courts making such determinations should take account of cases 
in which courts granted exemptions,445 in addition to cases where courts 
found that a law was not a substantial burden or where the government 
satisfied the compelling interest test.446 
2.  “Person” v. “Person’s Exercise of Religion”:  The Result Is the Same 
By understanding this background, it becomes clear that the Seventh and 
Tenth Circuits’ analysis of persons covered by RFRA is stronger than the 
Third Circuit’s approach.  The analysis at this phase of the HHS mandate 
litigation requires statutory interpretation of RFRA rather than a discussion 
of the Free Exercise Clause’s contours.  The key issue in each case is 
whether RFRA’s “person” exercising religion includes secular, for-profit 
corporations.  Because the statute does not define this operative term, courts 
must analyze RFRA’s context to determine if the default definition447 that 
includes corporations, partnerships, trusts, and other associations is 
appropriate, in accordance with the Dictionary Act.  Regardless of how 
broadly courts construe RFRA’s “context,” corporations arguably fall 
within RFRA’s reach. 
a.  Most Narrow Interpretation:  Purely Textual Analysis and 
the Dictionary Act 
At the most narrow level of interpretation, a court will look purely within 
the statute’s text.448  “Person” standing alone would clearly receive the 
Dictionary Act’s default definition, because nothing in the text explicitly 
disclaims application to corporations.449  The Court’s artificial person 
canon bolsters this position.450  As used in RFRA, however, the word 
person includes the modification “person’s exercise of religion,” so the 
 
 441. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
 442. See supra notes 34–35 and accompanying text. 
 443. See supra notes 148–51 and accompanying text. 
 444. See supra notes 150–51, 154 and accompanying text. 
 445. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 446. See supra notes 94–100 and accompanying text. 
 447. See supra note 215 and accompanying text. 
 448. See supra Part II.A.1.a. 
 449. See supra note 317 and accompanying text. 
 450. See supra note 215. 
1994 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
Dictionary’s Act context requirement might entail a broader approach.451  
The federal courts’ definition of exercise of religion is any conduct that is 
motivated by a religious belief,452 and the Free Exercise Clause 
undoubtedly protects both individual and institutional religious exercise.453  
The corporations involved in this litigation pass this test through their 
actions, which include proselytization, charitable giving, closing on holy 
days, and providing health insurance plans that may withhold drugs and 
devices contrary to certain religious beliefs.454  These are religiously 
motivated actions that either for-profit or nonprofit corporations can take.  
In addition, protecting corporations generally fits within the purposes of 
RFRA:  among other things, Congress intended to protect those who 
engaged in activities that a secular government would not deem “religious” 
but which might be important to the claimant acting in accordance with a 
belief.455 
The obvious objection here is that the corporation itself does not have 
beliefs.456  This objection, however, fails to appreciate that a board of 
directors can direct—and many in this litigation have directed—the 
corporation’s bylaws, ethical statements, or statements of purpose to 
include religious tenets in accordance with which the corporation operates.  
This is similar to the free speech context, where a corporation’s “speech” 
comes from the direction of its officers and directors in their 
decisionmaking capacity.457  No special rules or laws govern corporate 
speech; it is the corporation itself that “speaks” at the direction of its 
board.458  Similarly, here, when corporate directors institute bylaws, 
statements, or guidelines, they define corporate beliefs upon which a 
corporation can act.  This is true of secular corporations, such as Whole 
Foods, Chipotle, and Facebook, seeking to institute a specific moral culture, 
and it is true of faith-based corporations, such as Hobby Lobby, seeking to 
institute a specific religious culture.459  An imperfect analogy is that the 
directors and officers are the “conscience” of the corporation because they 
direct conduct in accordance with religious belief.460 
b.  Most Broad Interpretation:  The Entire Free Exercise 
Jurisprudence and Bellotti 
Even at the broadest possible level of context—the Supreme Court’s 
entire free exercise jurisprudence—the argument that RFRA can include 
corporations succeeds.  Because application of RFRA to for-profit 
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corporations is a novel question, the best indication of how the Court would 
analyze this approach is the Bellotti test.461  Here, again, the Tenth and 
Seventh Circuits more fully captured the spirit of religious liberty than the 
Third Circuit.  Bellotti instructs that application of a certain constitutional 
provision depends on whether the provision is “purely personal,” as 
measured by the nature, history, and purpose of the clause.462  The Third 
Circuit examined the history of the Free Exercise Clause and correctly 
found that the Supreme Court has never found that a secular corporation can 
exercise religion.463  This analysis, however, is incomplete because it fails 
to consider the nature and purpose prongs of Bellotti and relies almost 
exclusively on the history prong.464  This leads to a weak appreciation of 
instances in which individuals pursuing profit successfully petitioned courts 
for relief from laws that burdened their religious practice.465  In addition, 
the Third Circuit’s analysis of the nature and purpose of religious liberty is 
lacking, because it fails to appreciate that the nature of free exercise is to 
protect conduct more broadly than conscience.466  Moreover, additional 
purposes of religious liberty are to ensure that government does not 
encroach on religion467 and to maintain the vibrant pluralism that has been 
part of the American fabric since the nation’s founding.468  Instead, the 
Conestoga court simply held that no prior cases of constitutional corporate 
religious exercise469 meant no future cases of statutory corporate religious 
exercise.470  The Conestoga court’s rejection of Bellotti471 was premature 
because Bellotti contained language about corporate First Amendment 
rights generally, and not just about the Free Speech Clause.472  RFRA, in 
turn, explicitly instructs courts to engage in an assessment of free exercise 
claims according to pre-Smith jurisprudence, which includes the potential 
for a Bellotti analysis.  The Third Circuit, therefore, missed a crucial part of 
the analysis by engaging in a purely constitutional and historical discussion 
and not engaging with RFRA’s text. 
The Hobby Lobby, Korte, and Gilardi courts provided a more robust 
analysis of the nature, history, and purpose of what the right to free exercise 
protects.473  Indeed, they addressed the issue in the manner that the Bellotti 
court instructed:  by analyzing what the right protects, rather than whether a 
corporation can claim that right.474  The Conestoga court did exactly the 
opposite.  A Bellotti analysis should take account of what Congress would 
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know in legislating RFRA:  America’s commitment to religious liberty 
from colonial days,475 the fact that free exercise protects conduct over 
conscience,476 the long-standing definition of “persons” as including 
corporations unless otherwise specified,477 and past statutes that show 
Congress knows how to create corporate or religious exemptions.478  The 
Tenth and Seventh Circuits incorporate these principles and show how 
RFRA can and should cover at least some corporations. 
The government’s position includes distinguishing between for-profit and 
nonprofit corporations and calling that distinction determinative.479  The 
practice of allowing nonprofit corporations to state claims for violations of 
their free exercise of religion during the Sherbert regime, however, shows 
that the mere act of incorporation does not destroy religious liberty.480  
Moreover, a profit motive cannot be determinative, as the Supreme Court 
has allowed individual business owners to state free exercise claims.481  In 
addition, as a normative matter, First Amendment issues can trump formal 
issues concerning the corporate form.482  Each of these points form a part of 
the pre-Smith jurisprudence that Congress restored with RFRA, and nothing 
in that jurisprudence expressly excludes for-profit corporations. 
Rather, Congress wanted courts to engage in a balancing act of RFRA’s 
contours, and it firmly offered its support to religious liberty by enacting a 
strict scrutiny test.  This is the important context for Bellotti purposes and 
should inform any analysis of RFRA. 
3.  A Brief Note on Legislative History 
Some have noted that RFRA’s legislative history, such as its committee 
reports, does not mention its application to corporations.483  Few, however, 
have noted that prior versions of RFRA introduced in Congress did, in fact, 
define the persons the statute meant to protect.484  Prior legislative history is 
frequently an unreliable source of legislative intent,485 especially in the 
absence of materials explaining changes and amendments, but RFRA’s 
history may present a plausible lesson to a judge willing to engage in this 
form of analysis.  At a minimum, the prior versions of the statute show that 
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Congress at times contemplated defining “person.”  In the initial draft, 
RFRA protected individuals and religious organizations, corporations, and 
associations.486  The next version omitted the religious modifier and, 
without any modification, protected individuals, corporations, 
organizations, associations, and other entities.487  This analysis yields the 
argument that successive versions of the proposed statute protected 
respectively larger categories of potential claimants.  The initial version 
protected individuals and religious groups; the next version dropped the 
religious modifier, seemingly offering the proposed statute’s protection to a 
broader constituency.  Indeed, the potential claimants in the second version 
would largely mirror those protected if the word “person” were not defined 
and the default Dictionary Act definition applied. Congress plausibly 
dropped the definition to avoid excess language where the Dictionary Act 
would apply. 
4.  The Corporate Form and Its Relevance to the HHS Mandate 
Notably, the Court’s corporate First Amendment jurisprudence has not 
settled on a theory of corporate personhood.  Indeed, in 2010, the Citizens 
United Court appeared to rely on two different theories to reach its 
holding.488  RFRA could accommodate either theory.  If the Court relies on 
the contractual theory that views a corporation as an association of 
shareholders, it could hold that a closely held corporation can exercise 
religion in much the same way it has allowed churches or religious groups 
to state RFRA and free exercise claims.489  The Court has not previously 
held that the mere act of incorporation restricts such a claim.  If the Court 
uses the real entity theory of corporations, then corporate religious exercise, 
such as proselytizing through advertisements or refusing to fund 
contraception through insurance plans, is religious conduct performed 
directly by the corporation.490  The individuals who direct the corporation 
would elect to maintain such a religious entity.491 
5.  Why the Common Law Model Is Crucial 
Having explored whether RFRA’s context precludes corporations from 
stating RFRA claims, this Note returns again to the common law model 
Congress directed the courts to create.  Two points will reinforce that this 
analysis of corporate RFRA rights has important limits. 
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a.  Congress Has the Final Say 
First, if courts allow secular corporations to state RFRA claims, then 
Congress can react.  It did, after all, expressly legislate a balancing test to 
replace the Supreme Court’s abandoned, constitutionally compelled 
Sherbert jurisprudence.  Moreover, it seemingly did so in response to 
Smith’s invitation to be solicitous of religious liberty492 and in accordance 
with Boerne’s allowance for congressional action based on its own 
interpretation of the Constitution.493  Congress, however, retained final say 
over courts’ decisionmaking, at least for federal purposes, as it always does 
when courts interpret its laws.494  As enacted, RFRA appears to grant 
protection to corporations.  If the Supreme Court holds this to be true and 
Congress disagrees, then Congress can amend the law accordingly.  
Conversely, if the Court denies standing under RFRA, then Congress can 
determine otherwise and adjust the law as needed.  The important point is 
that the Court should examine this claim as a statutory matter and not a 
constitutional one. 
b.  Courts Should Develop a Jurisprudence To Determine the Contours of 
Corporate RFRA Claims 
Second, RFRA allows the Court to develop a statutory jurisprudence.  
This is in contrast to the Sherbert regime, which was based in the  
Constitution.  As Justice Sotomayor explained in her in-chambers opinion, 
the HHS mandate litigation presents a novel claim for religious liberty.495  
The Court should not attempt to answer the RFRA question for all 
corporate forms496 in one fell swoop.  Corporate free speech provides an 
analogue to this point.  As the D.C. Circuit noted, Citizens United only 
emerged after decades of excruciating analysis of the corporate speech 
right.497  The Court did not allow corporations to claim the protections of 
the Free Speech Clause overnight.  Similarly, courts addressing the HHS 
mandate cases should not define these cases as determining whether all—or 
even most—corporations have RFRA rights. 
The corporate plaintiffs in the cases percolating in the federal courts are 
organized as closely held corporations.498  The owners of such corporations 
also frequently tend to be the directors and managers, and they might make 
business decisions that subvert their desire for profit to follow the 
commands of their religion.499  For this reason, a closely held corporation 
might state a claim under RFRA if its directors and owners instruct it to 
follow religious conduct, and a law burdens that conduct.  As Judge Sykes 
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indicated, the individual owners do not compartmentalize their lives into 
business and religion, so RFRA’s purposes could plausibly accommodate 
an expansion of existing law to cover certain business.500  In fact, the Court 
might find that allowing closely held corporations to state RFRA claims 
will encourage individual flourishing, support religious pluralism, and 
provide an important mediating layer between persons and government—all 
of which are purposes of religious liberty.501 
For the same reasons, a multinational, publicly held corporation will 
likely struggle to have the same dedication to a religious belief and could 
very easily fall outside of RFRA’s protection.502  Its owners and directors 
likely will not present a unified religious face, and the profit-generating 
capacity of the business will act by necessity to compartmentalize the 
individual shareholders and directors’ religious and business lives.  Simply 
put, a more diverse ownership will likely not tolerate a religious 
accommodation in its pursuit of profit.  Moreover, such corporations are 
unlikely to be seen as promoting human flourishing or religious pluralism in 
the way that small, community-oriented businesses might be.503  Only after 
a developed jurisprudence emerges, however, will the full contours of this 
issue be visible.  To cut such a nascent jurisprudence off now, however, 
would be an injustice to religious liberty and those religious believers who 
see their small businesses as an extension of their religious life.  
Corporations should have the ability to state RFRA claims, and the Court 
should allow the federal judiciary to engage in an adjudicative process that 
seeks to determine the contours between religious liberty and corporate 
form. 
B.  If the Court Precludes All Corporations From RFRA, Then the D.C. 
Circuit Provides an Alternative Approach 
If the Supreme Court rejects the above analysis, it should affirm the D.C. 
Circuit’s shareholder-standing exception.504  Although the details of this 
standing rule are beyond the scope of this Note, the Gilardi court provided 
a persuasive reason for why a close corporation should be able to state the 
claims of its shareholders.  Incorporation should not equal the 
disappearance of a constitutional or statutory right without a corporate 
analogue.505  If a sole proprietor or a nonprofit corporation may claim 
protection, then it is a perverse incentive to religious believers to withhold 
protection upon incorporation.  This shareholder exception would allow 
owners to state claims that their corporations are otherwise precluded from 
litigating.  Doing this would preserve the American tradition of protecting 
 
 500. See supra note 362 and accompanying text. 
 501. See supra note 239 and accompanying text. 
 502. See Willis, supra note 11, at 71–72. 
 503. Cf. supra note 239 (listing scholars and an activist group that reject the notion of 
rights for corporations). 
 504. See supra Part II.C. 
 505. See supra notes 421–22 and accompanying text. 
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religious liberty while also maintaining a formal respect for the corporate 
form. 
CONCLUSION 
Some other aspect of the RFRA analysis might conceivably  doom 
Hobby Lobby and other for-profit corporations in their quest for an 
exemption from the HHS mandate.  Courts might find that providing the 
contraceptives to which they object may not be a substantial burden or that 
the government has a compelling interest to override the plaintiffs’ 
objections.  This will undoubtedly be the source of much future litigation.  
The question of these corporations’ ability to exercise religion and their 
standing under RFRA, however, should not be the fatal aspect.  The support 
given to religious liberty by Congress, the Supreme Court, the Founders, 
and, ultimately, the American people is simply too great for such a result to 
be satisfactory. 
